APRIL 28, 1982 • $1.50

If Reagan Quits: Kemp or Bush?

Max Lerner • Edmund Morgan • Eugene McCarthy

THE NEW REPUBLIC

The Real Way To Prevent Nuclear War

BY CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER

"Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation." That was Winston Churchill's description of what he called "the balance of terror." Each superpower has the ability to incinerate the defenseless

[continued on page 15]

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CORRESPONDENCE

TNR's Democratic Vision

To the editors:
Congratulations on your issue with its excellent program for 1984 ("The Agenda After Reagan," TNR, March 31). Your editorial, "A First Draft for '84," and your article by Michael Walzer, "Wanted—Moral Engagement," make a superb beginning for any reader. It is the finest challenge THE NEW REPUBLIC has thrown down to thinking people in many a year.

Morris Milgram
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

To the editors:
Your special issue was disappointing. I had a difficult time distinguishing the proposed Democratic Party platform from existing Reagan Administration policy. In the article on foreign policy by Walter Laqueur and Charles Krauthammer, the authors appear to be in a bidding war with the Reagan Administration over who can be shriller and more bellicose. The authors state that in the Persian Gulf, "U.S. foreign policy should make it absolutely clear that an intervention from the outside, directly or by proxies, would have incalculable consequences for world peace." Are we to take that statement to mean that a "demonstration nuclear blast" or a "limited nuclear war" should be a part of our policy in the Middle East? The authors seem to have forgotten the statement at the beginning of their article that military strength is not a policy.

The article in the same issue by R. James Woolsey, "Defense and Arms Control," appears to be a wish list of various types of military components that outdoes the current Reagan Administration defense budget. And Mr. Woolsey's prime prescription will be mandatory "national service." The Democratic Party certainly will appear as the champion of individual freedoms on that one!

William H. Howison
Portland, Maine

To the editors:
In the Foreign Policy section of your special issue, Walter Laqueur and Charles Krauthammer call for building a consensus to support freedom and to preserve the peace. But after a paragraph of criticism of the Reagan Administration, the writers say, "The absence of a global strategy, of a basic concept of how to pursue American ideas and interests, has been the hallmark of the Republican Administration."

Unfortunately the writers did not give us a role model to refer to. The liberal Democratic Presidents since World War II have given us the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War, and the unseating of a friendly head of state, accompanied by the humiliation of 444 days of hostage-holding of diplomatic personnel. With the exception of the Bay of Pigs, each of these ventures was ended under a Republican President. The Reagan Administration has engaged in a peaceful election in El Salvador in which the apparent error was an underestimate of the will of the people to vote and an underestimate of right-wing strength.

Would Laqueur and Krauthammer like to support the thesis that the strategy of the four Democratic postwar Presidents has provided a "basic concept of how to pursue American ideas and interests. . . . "?

Kirk A. Wickersham
Edina, Minnesota

To the editors:
"The Agenda After Reagan" is a terrific product and you should be proud of it. The magazine has found its voice and I think has become the sanest and most eloquent voice for progressive politics. Judging from my conversations around town, that opinion is widely shared.

Bernard Aronson
Democratic National Committee
Washington, D.C.

To the editors:
R. James Woolsey, in writing the arms control plank of your imaginary Democratic platform, recommends that the U.S. immediately seek agreement with the Soviet Union on "overall limitations and reductions in the aggregate size of ballistic missiles and the number of their warheads." Yet he objects in the next paragraph to a bilateral freeze, on the grounds that verifiability would be hard to achieve, politically and technically.

Why does Mr. Woolsey suppose that acceptable conventions for verifying actual arms reductions would be any easier to come by than similar conventions for standing in place?

The verifiability argument is in this case spurious. Mr. Woolsey's real objection is his unsupported contention that "existing Soviet nuclear forces and unconstrained Soviet nonnuclear programs could steadily increase our strategic vulnerability" under a freeze. I wonder if the Soviets feel the same way about American forces. And even if this were true, it would only be a threat if we went no further than the freeze, which surely is no one's intention. The freeze concept may be the only way to break this logical deadlock.

Tony Zito
East Sullivan, New Hampshire

To the editors:
I want to congratulate you on the special issue of THE NEW REPUBLIC. The left is floundering in its search for new directions and ways to rearticulate old values. As you say in your disclaimer, this agenda is not a definitive platform, but it does provide a basis for dialogue.

Russell D. Hemenway
National Committee
for an Effective Congress
New York, New York

To the editors:
"The Agenda After Reagan" was a great collection of essays. I'm amazed at the far-sightedness of THE NEW REPUBLIC in making a wide-ranging series of proposals a full seven years before anyone will have a chance to implement them.

William K. Lane Jr.
Stratford, Connecticut

On Translating Rilke

To the editors:
I thought Erich Heller's review of my translation of *Selected Poems of Rilke* (TNR, March 3) was absurd. German academics in the United States have written for years as if they wanted to keep German literature for themselves. They've done that so well that virtually no one reads Goethe's short poems. Mr. Heller is right on the poems in which I do poorly, but he doesn't mention the poems in which I do well. He's not really reviewing, but bragging that he's a cultured European. Of course it would be wonderful to have everything in a poem translated—sound, image, rhythm, rhymes—but a person who imagines that everything can be translated is not living in the world translators live in. Erich Heller writes as if Ezra

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Pound, and his thought on translation, had never existed. Pound correctly said that the purpose of translation is not to bring a poem over perfectly, but to help the poet become useful to and nourishing in another culture, in this case American. That is why translations need to be redone every twenty years. My Rilke book is an attempt, like those by distinguished translators before me, to bring this great poet over into our language and culture. I do not apologize for not rhyming, and the German is on the left, if Mr. Heller prefers to read that.

Robert Bly
Moose Lake, Minnesota

Erich Heller replies:
It so happened that on the day I read Mr. Bly's indignant letter I received a new edition of the Penguin book of Goethe's selected verse in German. A wise and discerning editor, David Luke —who acknowledges the occasional intervention of W. H. Auden—has supplied at the foot of the pages prose translations of the poems that clearly would resist any attempt to transform them into acceptable English poetry. So much for the sparse audiences Goethe's poems have attracted abroad. Not even a more ardent American patriot than Ezra Pound could be intent on nourishing his native culture by bad translations such as Mr. Bly has perpetrated in the case of Rilke. They are simply a disservice to the original poet as well as to the English language.

URGING NEGOTIATIONS

To the editors:
In an editorial THE NEW REPUBLIC chastises me and my friends for signing a statement that urges an end to support by the United States to the El Salvador junta ("Elections Count," TNR, April 14). I would like briefly to indicate here the grounds for my opinion, so that TNR readers will not suppose I have abandoned my democratic convictions or lost my mind.

On certain fundamentals TNR and I agree. We would like to see a government in El Salvador that put an end to terror, whether by guerrillas or thugs drawn from the army, and would improve the lot of ordinary people through social reform. We oppose totalitarian elements on both "left" and "right." We regret the split between

continued on page 4

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

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CORRESPONDENCE, *from page 3*

Napoleón Duarte, the Christian Democrat, and Guillermo Ungo, the Social Democrat, both of whom charge the other with being to one extent or another the captive of his undemocratic allies (a crucial difficulty being to determine exactly to what extent).

I suspect that by now, once civil war has broken out, there is little chance for a decent, democratic solution. El Salvador lacks a strong liberal tradition, or a strong middle class that might nurture such a tradition, or a working class steeped in social democratic politics. It lacks just about everything except the habit of joint, brutal domination by tiny oligarchy of the rich and a rotten army that sometimes does the work of the oligarchy and sometimes chooses to serve no one but itself.

The only hope, a slim one, for a decent, democratic solution is through negotiations, after which Duarte and Ungo might form a bloc against the killers on both sides. But—and here comes the nub of our disagreement—for the U.S. to commit itself unconditionally to the junta in El Salvador (and now, it appears, to start finding virtues even in the probable new government in which the pathological killer, Roberto d'Aubuisson, would be dominant) is to destroy any chance for negotiations, to ensure a lengthy civil war, and make all the more likely the eventual victory of the guerrillas.

For remember that it has been the junta which refused to negotiate and the political arm of the opposition, led by Ungo, which proposed negotiations. Whether the opposition is "sincere" in this proposal can be tested only in one way—by starting to negotiate. As long as the army in El Salvador knows it can count on all-but-unlimited support from the Reagan Administration, it sees no need to negotiate. D'Aubuisson has promised, in fact, to destroy the guerrillas in three months through using "napalm." Are your memories so short, dear friends of TNR, that you don't recognize that kind of language?

TNR says the election in El Salvador was honest. Perhaps. It's possible the promiscuous murders and terrorism unleashed by thugs drawn from and protected by the El Salvador armed forces suddenly came to an end. It's possible that peasants in the outlying districts were no longer intimidated. But how do you know? Were the "outside observers" really able to check this? Why not show toward such claims of "honest elections" at least a little of the skepticism you would show if they were made by a "left-wing" government?

You criticize Ungo and his colleagues for not participating in the government. Well, I don't agree with Ungo's strategy and I do agree with you that if the guerrillas win, he'll probably be among their first victims. But surely there is some validity to the claim made by Ungo and other non-Communist oppositionists that they feared to participate in elections because they feared for their lives. Their only experience with the junta, they said, was that of murder. Doesn't the experience of the last two years give *some* validity to this claim? As also to the linked argument that so long as the army in El Salvador remains unchecked and unpurged, it will always be able to enact its will upon the country, elections or no elections.

Liberals and democratic socialists ought not to "support" either side in El Salvador, but to urge a ceasefire, negotiations, and reconciliation of democrats. That is why our statement supported a Congressional resolution to that effect—not, please, because we thought negotiations can be "legislated by the U.S. Congress" (we really aren't idiots) but because such a Congressional resolution could have an important impact in behalf of negotiations.

Irving Howe
New York, New York

SCHOLARLY ALLUSIONS

To the editors:

M. P. is having trouble with his history again. In "Washington Diarist" (TNR, March 31), commenting on "Let them eat cake," he attributed the statement to "females of the First Estate." The First Estate? Was he perhaps thinking of the Abbess of Tart?

David H. Pinkney, past president
American Historical Association
Seattle, Washington

To the editors:

It's one thing to say that Nancy Reagan is as callous as Marie Antoinette. A bit rhetorical. But who's to mind? It's another thing to say that someone at *Princeton* wants to credit the statement, "Let them eat cake," "primarily to females of the First Estate." Princeton may have fallen on evil days. But as an old Tiger I mind. The "stone-hearted French aristocrats" with whom Nancy Reagan is associated belonged to the second estate. The first estate was composed of the clergy.

Scholarly allusions can be nice—especially when they are both appropriate and accurate.

D. C. Moore
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

The editors reply:
Touché.

REAGAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS

To the editors:

When will the press take Ronald Reagan seriously? Surely by now you have seen, and printed, enough evidence to prove that Ronald Reagan is not a well-meaning but lightweight bumbler.

Nick Kotz's "The War on the Poor" (TNR, March 24) demonstrates one more time the consequences of Reagan's budget: less money, less education, less food, less health for the poor and disadvantaged. Mainstream liberals like Morton Kondracke see the evidence, and cry out that Reagan is doing terrible things ("Reagan's I.Q.," TNR, March 24). He must not understand the consequences of his actions. He must be "out of touch," soft in the head, dumb.

Such is not the conservative ideal. Whatever moral pirouettes George Will performs, that 6 percent interest rate is the goal of men whose idea of success is wealth and power. Minimums of food and shelter, equal opportunity, and justice are all right if they happen to trickle down along the way. Certainly they are pleasant things for the hogs to chat about before dipping their snouts back into the trough.

The 1980 Republican platform spelled out Reagan's aims: military buildup, return to the traditional family, the end of government interference in the "private sector." If success comes from turning one's goals into reality, Reagan has succeeded. Military spending is up, social spending down, and women in the workplace are receiving daily the bad news. The problem with Reagan is not that he means well, but that he lacks the brain power. The problem with Reagan is that he means the liberal vision of America great harm and has proved so far quite capable of getting his way.

Jim Marks
Washington, D.C.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

FOUNDED 1914 — *A Weekly Journal of Opinion* — ISSUE 3,511

WASHINGTON, D.C. — APRIL 28, 1982

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2 **CORRESPONDENCE** ..... 1984 agenda; Irving Howe on El Salvador; &c.

6 **TRB FROM WASHINGTON** .... OUR TAXING SYSTEM

7 **THE EDITORS** ..... SECRECY MANIA
One thing the Administration isn't keeping secret is its program to weaken freedom of information.
NOTEBOOK

9 **HENRY RAYMONT** ..... ERRORS ALL AROUND
How Argentina and Britain, with some help from Washington, created a disaster in the Falklands.

10 **EUGENE J. MCCARTHY** ..... DIAMOND DIPLOMACY
The National Pastime goes international.

13 **MADELEINE G. KALB** ..... U.N. ABDICATION
The Multinational Force in the Sinai is a brave experiment, made necessary by the U.N.'s failure to uphold the Charter's principles in the Mideast.

15 **CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER** ..... HOW TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR
It is typical of the paradoxical, inescapable logic of nuclear weapons that a freeze might actually make the world less secure. There is a better way: deterrence, arms control, conventional defense.

20 **FRED BARNES** ..... JACK AND GEORGE
If the Gipper bows out in '84, Kemp and Bush will fight for the honor of winning one for him.

24 **STANLEY KAUFFMANN** ..... ON FILMS: IN BALTIMORE, FOR INSTANCE
Diner is a very good, very unthreatening movie.

26 **MAX LERNER** ..... VISIONS OF THE APOCALYPSE
The Fate of the Earth by Jonathan Schell

29 **EDMUND S. MORGAN** ..... THE ARGUMENT FOR THE STATES
The Complete Anti-Federalist
edited, with commentary and notes, by Herbert J. Storing
with the assistance of Murray Dry

32 **BARRY GOLDENSOHN** ..... POEM: *The Garrotted Man (Goya)*

34 **WILLIAM H. PRITCHARD** ..... MAN OF LETTERS
Critical Observations by Julian Symons

38 **FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING** ..... UNCLE SAM'S WARS ON CRIME
Annual Report to the American Bar Association
by the Chief Justice of the United States
U.S. v. Crime in the Streets by Thomas E. Cronin, Tania Z. Cronin, and Michael E. Milakovich
Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime (1981)

43 **WASHINGTON DIARIST** ..... CURIOUS CODES

COVER Typographic design by Richard Jester for THE NEW REPUBLIC.

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APR 15 1982

THE NEW REPUBLIC, Volume 186, Number 17, Issue 3,511, April 28, 1982. Published weekly (except the weeks of January 13, July 21, August 18, and September 22) at 1220 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036. Telephone (202) 331-7494. Advertising: (202) 331-9787. Leadership Network advertising: (212) 682-4500. Single copy, $1.50; yearly subscriptions, $32; foreign, $39; students, $18. © 1982 by The New Republic, Inc. (ISSN 0028-6583). Second-class postage paid at Washington, DC, and additional mailing offices. Indexed in Readers' Guide and Media Review Digest. Available on microfilm from University Microfilms International, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Member of the Audit Bureau of Circulation. Unsolicited manuscripts are welcome, but cannot be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. **Subscribers:** Please send all remittances, changes of address, and inquiries about subscriptions and undelivered copies to **Subscription Service Department, The New Republic, P.O. Box 955, Farmingdale, NY 11737.**

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TRB

FROM WASHINGTON

Our Taxing System

The strange American income tax system is breaking down. Most of us have just come through our annual wrestle with Form 1040, so we have the problem fresh in mind. Though the untidy ordeal is now behind us, many of the nation's economic problems are still unresolved and there's a deadlock between President Reagan and Congress that may or may not be promptly settled. We are the only land that has this system. The trouble with it is that it is unfair, doesn't raise enough money, encourages people to spend rather than save, leaves the nation with bigger and bigger deficits, generally creates a White House-Congressional deadlock (like the present one), and is evaded more and more often. For twenty years I have been writing that the income tax system is overdue for a complete overhaul. We got one in 1975 that was supposed to bring revolutionary improvements. Alas, that reformed code now seems to be breaking down, too.

European nations don't handle taxation quite this way. They have corporate and other taxes, but since the 1960s the nine Common Market countries have also adopted something known as the VAT—the Value Added Tax. How would Treasury Secretary Regan, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Volcker, and President Reagan—not to mention Tip O'Neill—feel if they had a taxation device that could bring in as much as $150 billion of the $1,500 billion spent in this country every year on personal consumption—all without the annual bother of Form 1040? The procedure isn't quite as easy as it sounds. It isn't like hanging sap buckets on to the maple sugar tax tree and collecting the drips in the spring. But it has some convenient features that deserve to be—and increasingly are being—considered.

What distinguishes the United States from other democracies is the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branches in Washington—the great invention designed by the Founding Fathers two centuries ago to save us from another monarchy. We can trace some of our current tax problems to the Revolution against George III. The United States is the only nation where the President submits a budget to the legislature and then faces the prospect of losing formal control of it: it is up to Congress to consider the President's telephone-book-sized budget, item by item, and then send it back to the executive. At this point he has a partial veto power, but not over individual details (an "item veto"); he sometimes has to accept an appropriation that he loathes, which has been fastened skillfully to the bill as a whole. It would be unthinkable in Ottawa for Parliament to boost the Prime Minister's budget—such a step would bring a quick dissolution and an election. In Washington, however, rewriting the President's budget is what the game's all about.

I always sympathize with a new American President. He starts out with such high hopes and his supporters believe that at last we have somebody who can make the system work. He will cut waste and inefficiency, make the bureaucrats behave. Then comes the usual letdown. Now Reagan is getting the treatment. We love communicators so much that we have picked one for President. He is the second chief executive who ran "against" Washington. (Compare the apprenticeship of Winston Churchill: he was in Parliament forty years before becoming Prime Minister.)

With a system as loose as ours, it's hard to keep finances under control. The deficit this year may be horrendous, perhaps $150 billion if Tip O'Neill and Reagan can't agree. Lyndon Johnson had the last balanced budget in 1969, and the one before that was in 1960 under Ike. The point is, of course, that the budget is balanced in one sense even if there's a deficit: it is "balanced" by issuing paper money, which is likely to cause inflation. The nation meets the deficit by an invisible tax which falls heaviest on the poor.

How about VAT? It might not make a great deal of difference: it is primarily a different way of collecting taxes. It is, in short, a nationwide sales tax. Everybody pays it automatically without seeing it, when they buy goods. It is a tax on consumption rather than income. The VAT tax is added to the price of a consumer good at each stage of production—from the cotton farmer to the textile producer to the dress manufacturer. The consumer who finally buys the dress gets stuck with the VAT that is passed along to her. It is self-enforcing because the farmer, the manufacturer, and the merchant serve as agents of the tax authority. As Yale professor Henry C. Wallich wrote, the administration of VAT is "free from many of the annoyances and opportunities for avoidance that deform the income tax, personal and corporate."

Ideally, the progressive income tax is fairer than a sales tax. It falls more heavily on the rich. The U.S. has carried the self-collecting income tax further than other nations and our annual rite of self-immolation has been the wonder of the world. But signs of strain show. The underground economy is growing. The federal income tax of fiscal year 1982 may bring in $300 billion out of $625 billion of combined budget receipts. But inflation pushes people into higher brackets, discontent is growing, the IRS guesses that the tax gap (the difference between what should have been paid and what was paid) jumped from $29 billion back in 1973 to $87 billion in 1981. That's a tidy sum. Is there a way of collecting that for the Treasury?

Whether we adopt VAT now, as Europe has done, or go on with our own threatened system, difficulties face us. Reagan pushes for higher defense expenditures and lower income taxes. Congress arranges a tax contraption whereby a money-losing corporation can sell its unused tax credits to a giant like GE or IBM in deals called "safe harbor leasing." Unemployment follows inflation as the bane of the poor. Herbert Stein, a right-of-center economist, writes, "If now the most classical, hard-line conservative president in fifty years accepts indefinite deferral of a balanced budget who will any longer be inhibited by fear of deficits?" Who indeed? Sooner or later the two separate parts of America's divided government must function together.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC
APRIL 28, 1982

SECRECY MANIA

"A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it," wrote James Madison, "is but a prologue to a farce, or a tragedy, or perhaps both." This fundamental truth inspired the First Amendment, and for the last thirty years, it has motivated efforts to open the flow of information from the government to the public. Yet this truth seems to have eluded President Reagan. Appalled by a few security breaches—but more often by policy leaks emanating from the top levels of his Administration—the President has taken extreme measures that will curtail the amount of information that citizens can obtain about their government. This Administration has released a flood of memoranda and executive orders and has supported numerous bills in Congress which will drastically increase the government's power to keep information secret. More information will be classified. It will remain classified longer, and public officials will be encouraged to classify, rather than to disclose. This will not help popular government.

The Central Intelligence Agency has been harassed, and the national interest undoubtedly damaged, by a small clutch of turncoats who systematically publish the names of U.S. intelligence agents. To combat the likes of Philip Agee, both Houses of Congress passed, and the Administration vigorously endorsed, a Foreign Agents Identity Bill. Now in House-Senate conference, the bill would make it a crime for news organizations, authors, or anyone else to publish the name of an agent, even one who is violating the law. The bill is so sweeping that under it *New York Times* correspondents could have been prosecuted for their stories on Frank Terpil and Edwin Wilson, the two former CIA agents who helped train and arm Libyan troops. The Administration claims that this broad definition will make it easier to punish those who name agents. No doubt. But it will also restrict the legitimate investigative activities of the press.

Last fall the President signed an executive order reversing the Carter Administration's policy prohibiting infiltration by intelligence agencies of domestic organizations. If the U.S. faced a serious terrorist threat, such a move might conceivably be justified, but now it is not. And, as the Reporter's Committee for the Freedom of the Press points out, the order may once again permit U.S. intelligence agencies to infiltrate and spy on the press, to wiretap reporters, and to monitor press mail and cables. CIA director William Casey has gone so far as to express support for surprise raids on newsrooms by federal agents when necessary to trace the source of national security leaks.

Even such worthwhile endeavors as Congressional modification of the Freedom of Information Act have been undermined by the Administration's actions. Passed in 1966, the FOIA was designed to help inform the public of its government's activities. Over the years it has been exploited in ways that Congress never foresaw. For example, although the act was intended to provide information to journalists, authors, and, through them, the public, a General Accounting Office report showed that only about 5 percent of requests for files were made by scholars and writers. The vast

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majority of FOIA users are law firms seeking evidence in litigation, and businesses trying to obtain information about their competitors. The FOIA apparently has also become a useful tool for criminals to learn the identity of government informants and to find out whether they are being watched. In fact, approximately 40 percent of FOIA requests received by the Drug Enforcement Agency are postmarked from state penitentiaries and another 20 percent come from lawyers representing drug traffickers.

After much debate, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah recently produced a bill that would address these FOIA abuses. Although the bill still contains some troubling language which may impair the legitimate use of the FOIA, it does provide specific protections for law enforcement and for greater business confidentiality. But this bill, considerably amended from Hatch's first draft, apparently was not strong enough for this secrecy-minded Administration. So on April 2 President Reagan signed an executive order that guarantees a major modification of the FOIA. The order provides that doubts about whether to classify a document be resolved in favor of classification, not, as before, in favor of release. It eliminates the requirements that the public interest of each document be weighed against the potential damage to national security, and that the national security risk be "identifiable" before a document is withheld. It also abolishes entirely the rule that all documents be automatically declassified by a certain date. In essence, the order does by fiat what the Hatch amendment wisely avoids—it shifts the premise of openness in government to a premise of secrecy. No longer is the burden upon the government to prove the need for classification, but upon the public to sue for documents and prove their innocuousness—a ridiculous notion, since the public can hardly argue for what it has not seen.

OF ALL THE various bills and Administrative directives, the Reagan executive order on national security classification is the most pernicious and misguided. It encourages classification as a means to manipulate public opinion by burying government error and political embarrassment, and, through the selective release of information, promoting the impression of government success. Moreover, when "national security risk" is a label indiscriminately tacked on to all government documents, sensitive or not, national security becomes a hollow term. Priority documents lose their priority, making them more susceptible to leaks. "When everything is classified, nothing is classified," wrote Justice Potter Stewart in his opinion on the Pentagon Papers case, "and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion."

As in so many of its other policies, the Reagan Administration has pursued its ideological convictions and fears to the point of mania. President Reagan and his aides do not understand the costs of the secrecy program they have put into effect—in terms of both lost public awareness and increased bureaucratic inefficiency. This is an Administration that believes in freedom of commerce, but apparently not in freedom of information. It seems to hope that it can secure public support for government policy by controlling what the public knows about policy. Democracy doesn't work that way.

NOTEBOOK

□ GLOBAL MISINFORMATION: "A majority of Iraq's 13 million citizens belong to the Shia branch of Islam." (From an editorial in the *Boston Globe*, April 9, 1982.) "Iraq is largely Sunni, the largest Moslem sect." (From a news story in the *Boston Globe*, April 9, 1982.) Pick your facts and hope your argument is unaffected. (According to the CIA's *World Factbook*, 50 percent of Iraq's population is Shia, 40 percent Sunni, and 10 percent other.)

□ FROM EXILE: The second of what had been billed as President Reagan's weekly fireside chats to the nation was actually delivered from a Caribbean surfside. The President is entitled to his vacations; the more the better, some say. But rest does not enhance his thinking faculties: "We haven't cut loans," he assured American families whose sons and daughters are right now receiving letters of admission to colleges and universities and wondering how to pay tuition fees. "We've cut the cost to taxpayers of making these loans available." This is one of those blithe verbal constructions with which the President consoles himself that, whatever the critics say, his policies do not block fulfillment of the American dream. Of course, to a poor boy who's made it big, the American dream seems especially fulfillable from Claudette Colbert's house in Barbados. Now if she would only invite Ronald Reagan's critics and victims, they too might see America his way.

□ WE ARE PLEASED to announce that C. Vann Woodward, one of TNR's contributing editors, has won the Pulitzer Prize for history for *Mary Chesnut's Civil War* (Yale University Press), an edition of the journals of Mary Boykin Chesnut, a Southerner whose diaries have long been an important source for American historians. Thanks to Professor Woodward's annotated edition, the journals are now textually accurate for the first time and illuminated by a new interpretation (see Louis D. Rubin's review, TNR, March 21, 1981, written before the book's author became a contributing editor).

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□ ONE REASON HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL will reduce its workload, according to the April 8 *New York Times*, is that second-year students need more time to talk to the four hundred corporate recruiters who come to the school each year. "Students have complained that the race to get interviews with top companies often occupies nearly all of their time," the *Times* reports. Now they won't have to waste quite as much time acquiring the skills they'll be selling.

□ FIFTY YEARS AGO IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: "Foreigners are fond of calling us the land of paradoxes. Our public finances certainly justify that characterization. The richest country in the world has been the most dilatory in balancing its budget and appears the most distracted and embarrassed in attaining that end. The fundamental explanation, of course, is the systematically inculcated hostility to the taxation of wealth. For ten years the press has sedulously repeated the Mellon doctrine that the immunity of the rich from taxation is a blessing for the poor. In times of prosperity appropriate taxes upon bloated incomes would discourage enterprise; in days of adversity there are no bloated incomes. That the Democratic party also should have succumbed so largely to this Mellon philosophy is bound to amuse the future historian of post-war America. But he will be more amazed than amused when he discovers that in the third year of the depression the official patriotic, nonpartisan effort to balance the budget was largely directed toward the imposition of consumption taxes." (Editorial, "The Supreme Court and a Balanced Budget," April 27, 1932.)

The Falklands dilemma.

Errors All Around

ARGENTINA'S MILITARY OCCUPATION of the bleak South Atlantic archipelago variously known as the Malvinas or Falkland Islands, and the possibility of its escalation into an outright war with Britain, has posed a supremely delicate dilemma for American diplomacy. In addition to trying to prevent a conflict between two friendly countries, the U.S. may be forced to choose which it values more: the Monroe Doctrine and the Inter-American system or the Atlantic alliance. The U.S. is trying to remain as the neutral mediator, but if the two sides actually fight, this stance may offend both parties and their respective friends. What's more, if the U.S. fails to stop the war, that will be another blow to our prestige.

What's baffling—and little remarked upon in the American media—is why the Administration waited to act as mediator until after the Argentine attack. There were ample advance indications that President Leopoldo Galtieri had begun preparations for the seizure of the islands, possibly even before one of Argentina's most experienced diplomats, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Ros, made a last appeal to the British at the United Nations on February 27 to activate the protracted sovereignty negotiations. Until this question is answered, there will be suspicions in Britain, as well as in Congress, that American equivocation, combined with the ostentatious friendship displayed by the Reagan Administration for Argentina's successive military regimes, may actually have encouraged the drastic Argentine move, albeit inadvertently.

A concerted campaign to press Washington to abandon its neutral stance on the 149-year-old Falklands dispute and tilt toward Argentina was launched by the Argentine government at least a year ago. Argentine diplomats cautioned the military authorities that it would be exceedingly difficult to drive a wedge between the Reagan Administration and the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. But top military leaders were confident of winning the support of the Pentagon and of such State Department officials as General Vernon Walters, a former deputy director of the CIA, who has become one of Secretary of State Alexander Haig's special advisers.

LAST AUGUST Oscar H. Camilión, then Argentine Foreign Minister, told me in an interview in Buenos Aires that marshaling U.S. support for Argentina's claim to the Malvinas had become "a major policy objective" of the government of then-President Viola. He said he had raised the matter with General Walters and U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, and thought he had received "a sympathetic hearing." Although he did not say so specifically, Camilión left the impression that he expected an affirmative response from Washington in return for his government's endorsement of U.S. policy in Central America, an area in which Argentina had never before shown much interest. Meanwhile, Argentina's military also seems to have expected support from Moscow in return for Argentina's refusal to join in the grain embargo against the Soviet Union imposed by President Carter. When the Soviet Union failed to veto the U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the Argentine invasion, the generals were outraged.

Argentina's rulers seem to have committed two other major miscalculations: they did not expect that Britain would defend its remote island possessions, or that the European Economic Community would abide by a British request for economic sanctions against Argentina any more than it did when the United States asked for such stringent measures against Iran, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Argentina's miscalculations reflect a high degree of self-delusion about its influence on the international scene, particularly with the two

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superpowers. This may be attributed to a combination of several factors: its remoteness from world power centers; an unwillingness of the military to listen to its diplomats; the military's need to divert attention from Argentina's deep social, political, and economic problems, many of which are manifestly self-inflicted; and, finally, a pervasive nostalgia for the promise of grandeur which the country's wealth and vital population held out at the turn of the century, when Argentines imagined they could challenge the United States for leadership of Latin America.

SOME OF these same factors came into play in connection with Argentina's territorial disputes with Chile in the 1970s, and those disputes may be a key factor in the Falklands affair. Argentina and Chile very nearly went to war in December 1978, after Argentina rejected an arbitration ruling by Britain awarding Chile control of key islands in the strategic Beagle Channel at the southern tip of South America. Only the last-minute intercession of the Vatican stopped an attack by the troops already massed along the Argentine side of the Patagonia. In recent months the Vatican's mediation efforts have resulted in a reaffirmation of Chilean sovereignty over the channel's three major islands. It is widely believed in Argentina that Argentina's military authorities had decided to swallow the loss of the islands rather than risk a war with Chile, and that they sought to pacify ultranationalistic elements in the Argentine Navy by seizing the Falklands from Britain.

But if Argentina miscalculated the consequences of its seizure of the Malvinas, Britain and the U.S. also miscalculated. The British government misread the mounting indications of an Argentine attack to the point where Lord Carrington elected to go to the Middle East just days before the Argentine takeover. He has now resigned as Foreign Secretary in acknowledgement of his error. The United States also failed to anticipate the Argentine move, despite the recent visits to Buenos Aires of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders, and a ceaseless stream of high U.S. military officers who have easy access to members of Argentina's military junta.

Meanwhile, much of the American media at least initially treated the Argentine incursion with the stereotyped levity and clichés usually reserved for Latin American events it neither understands nor cares about very much. Some columnists and editorial writers regarded it as opéra bouffe, the same way they deal with "football" wars between "banana republics." Liberal critics, rightly disturbed by the repressive record of Argentina's military rulers, scored Reagan for professing U.S. neutrality in the Malvinas dispute, evidently unaware that he was essentially reiterating a policy first enunciated by Secretary of State Daniel Webster 143 years ago and continued to this day under both Democratic and Republican Administrations.

More thoughtful foreign policy analysts contrasted Britain's key role in the Atlantic alliance and her shared cultural and democratic values with the United States with Argentina's long history of diplomatic hostility to Washington in the Western Hemisphere. Yet all too few went on to discuss the conflict posed by an equally deep-rooted purpose of the United States—to protect the New World from outside intervention. As Thomas Jefferson wrote to President Monroe on October 24, 1823: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with trans-Atlantic affairs." Thus was born the Monroe Doctrine, which unilaterally announced to the world that the United States would declare any attempt of the European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." Resistance to outside interference is a cornerstone of the Charter of the Organization of American States. It's no wonder that during the first two weeks of the crisis, the Reagan Administration steadfastly resisted Argentine attempts to seek action by the OAS Council, which has a bias against European Britain—which also happens to be Washington's Atlantic ally. Caught in a dilemma, the U.S. is doing all it can do in trying to mediate the conflict. If the Falklands dispute does not devolve into a military catastrophe, it may have at least one salutary effect, reminding the U.S. that anti-Communism can't be the sole concern of our inter-American policy.

HENRY RAYMONT

Henry Raymont, a Washington writer, was *New York Times* bureau chief in Buenos Aires in the mid-1960s.

Our international pastime.

DIAMOND DIPLOMACY

FOR MOST of its illustrious history, baseball, like art, has been kept not just out of international politics, but above it. Now there are threatening signs that baseball may become a major piece in the chess game of diplomacy between East and West, North and South, West and Far East, at the high level of ideology and the low level of economics and trade.

In the past, other sports and sporting events have been drawn into international political controversies. President Carter's effort to torpedo the 1980 Moscow Olympics was not without precedent. In recent years the political conflict in South Africa has affected inter-

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WHAT IN THE WORLD IS GOING ON?

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

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national soccer games, while the Brits are currently plotting to keep Argentina out of the world cup. Strains in the Washington-Peking friendship, which was originally founded on ping-pong, are beginning to affect volleyball.

As long as baseball was solely an American game, played seriously and professionally only in the United States, there was no possibility of its being caught up in international political disputes. But with the game catching on in other countries, notably in Japan and Central America, the politicizing process is under way.

Until recently there was no disposition to interfere with the free movement of baseball players among the countries of the free world. American players are allowed to play in the non-Communist countries of Central and South America, and Central and South American players from non-Communist countries are permitted to play in the United States. Japanese baseball teams have a quota on American players (no more than three longnoses in the lineup), but the American teams have not retaliated. (U.S. trade quotas are restricted to Japanese cars, which, like American ballplayers in Japan, are better than the domestic product.) Thus far there have been no baseball defectors from Communist countries, but it is fair to assume that they would be accepted in the major leagues, as defectors from Czechoslovakia have been accepted in professional hockey.

ONE RECENT threat to this detachment of baseball from international politics and law seems to have blown over. The threat arose over the contract dispute between the Los Angeles Dodgers and Mexican pitcher Fernando Valenzuela. Having learned from American baseball players that contracts are not sacred, Valenzuela has been holding out for a salary increase above the $42,000 he agreed to last year. Valenzuela's agent was asking for one million dollars for this season. Valenzuela does not speak English, but he knows the difference between dollars and pesos. Some inflation-minded Dodger fans have suggested that Valenzuela be denied a work permit and deported under the strict letter of immigration law, which excludes nonquota aliens and temporary workers from foreign countries—unless they can perform services which are necessary to the United States and services which no available American can perform. Whether Valenzuela's screwball is necessary to the United States, or is different from any screwball thrown by an American pitcher, has not been settled by our immigration service. Meanwhile, Valenzuela is back on the mound for the Dodgers without a new contract.

Another sign of change comes in threats to the free movement of baseball equipment and supplies in international trade. This change first became apparent a few years ago, when one America First group asked whether it was proper that baseballs for the great American game be made in Haiti. The baseball uniforms and equipment, especially for Little Leaguers, imported from Taiwan, have been included in the list of imported goods that constitute a "threat to the American economy." And Japanese exclusion of American-made aluminum baseball bats has been cited by our trade negotiators as discriminatory. The Japanese will not allow the American bats to be used in Japan on the specious grounds that they do not meet Japanese standards of quality control. It was one thing for the Japanese to say that about American cars and TV sets, but baseball bats are a point of honor.

THE MOST SERIOUS and longest running international conflict involving baseball, one which has been bad for both baseball and international order, has been that between Cuba and the United States. When the United States placed an embargo on Cuban sugar in 1961, Cuba retaliated by putting its own embargo on the export of baseball players. (Twenty-one years later, Tony Perez, who was a designated hitter last season for the Boston Red Sox, is the only known survivor from happier days.) Clark Griffith, former owner of the Washington Senators baseball team, was one of the early importers of Cuban players. In part, this was his answer to other owners who had begun to use black American players, a practice which Griffith did not endorse with enthusiasm. Among the early finds by Senators scouts were two pitchers, Pedro Ramos and Camilo Pasqual. Another prospect scouted by the Senators in those early years was a pitcher named Fidel Castro. He was turned down because a scouting report said that he didn't have a major league fast ball. An aspiring pitching ace spurned can be a dangerous man with a long memory.

Castro's continuing interest in baseball was noted by the CIA and became the basis for some of the agency's assassination plans. Our operatives tried first to get him to play catch with a baseball loaded with explosives. This proposal went far beyond the highly liberal and flexible rules of international intrigue. Later, the CIA shifted to the more limited plot of sending Castro cigars containing a drug which would make his hair and beard fall out, thus destroying his charisma. This idea, having its historical beginnings with Samson and Delilah, was within the acceptable range of international dirty tricks. The proposed use of the baseball bomb clearly was without precedent, and Castro was reported to have particularly resented the subversion of his favorite game, even if it was originally Yanqui.

It is obvious that the State Department and the CIA have not grasped baseball's potential as a force in international relations. What the Bay of Pigs could not accomplish, baseball might. Faced with a choice between baseball and Socialism, Cubans surely would choose baseball. The incompatibility of the game with a Socialist society is demonstrated in a story reported from Cuba by Reuters in March. Seventeen unidentified baseball players and coaches have been suspended

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and arrested, and now face trial on charges of conspiring with gamblers in a game-fixing scheme. No umpires were reported to have been involved. The official government newspaper of Cuba declared that the exploitation of sports and profiteering on athletics are practices of a capitalist society. It said the players were motivated by "zeal for profits, egotism, individualism, and mercantile spirit," among other things. This is essentially what was said about major league players in the United States during last summer's baseball strike.

The final announcement out of Cuba was that names of the players involved had been deleted from the record books, since "they do not deserve the honor of appearing in the history of our nation's baseball." This is the same ultimate punishment that was meted out to players in the infamous Black Sox scandal in the U.S.

The obvious conclusion is that we needn't think about blockading Cuba or "going to the source," as Al Haig keeps threatening. Rather, we should be trying to corrupt Communism with capitalism. If we must have a Radio Free Cuba, we should use it to broadcast a steady diet of the latest news on baseball scores and baseball salaries.

EUGENE J. MCCARTHY

Eugene J. McCarthy, a former first baseman in the Great Soo League, is running for the Senate again in Minnesota.

What is the U.S. doing in Sinai?

U.N. ABDICATION

ON APRIL 25, 1982, three years after the signing of the Camp David accords, Israel completes its withdrawal from the Sinai. The United Nations General Assembly, citing the U.N. Charter's commitment to peace, unanimously adopts a resolution hailing this historic treaty between two nations that have fought four wars since 1948. The Secretary General proclaims Egypt-Israel Day, and calls upon all member states to provide troops and other assistance for the international force that will monitor the border between the former enemies. Offers pour in from every corner of the globe.

Fantasy, pure fantasy. The realities are these: on April 25 Israel *does* withdraw from the Sinai. But there is a resounding silence from the U.N. General Assembly, which previously has condemned the Camp David accords by huge majorities as a violation of Palestinian rights. The Secretary General and his staff, who have washed their hands of Camp David, take no official notice of the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state. The international force along the Egyptian-Israeli border is organized and staffed, not by the United Nations, but by the United States and its allies. This 2,600-member, American-sponsored peacekeeping force, the Multinational Force and Observers, is an entirely new phenomenon in international diplomacy: innovative, controversial, a reflection of the drama that has unfolded since Anwar Sadat's sudden journey to Jerusalem in 1977.

THE MFO violates all the rules of international peacekeeping developed by U.N. experts over the years. According to these rules, there must first be agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the nature and scope of the operation. Next there must be the broadest possible consensus among the other members of the U.N. Then the peacekeeping troops should be supplied by small, preferably neutral, countries. Finally, the great powers should never play a direct role in the operation.

There is no such agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union about the new Sinai force. The Russians reject Camp David and the MFO. There is no broad consensus in the international community; the third world refuses to acknowledge anything connected with Camp David, and even the neutral European countries, such as Ireland or Sweden (the U.N.'s favorite troop-contributors) have kept their distance. Instead, the United States, which has traditionally remained in the wings, providing logistical support to the U.N. peacekeepers, is now center stage, as director and principal actor. It has chosen a pro-Western cast, leaning heavily on the NATO countries, and it is providing nearly half the troops itself.

This unprecedented action has begun to raise questions in the region about U.S. intentions. The 1,100 American troops are part of the 82nd Airborne Division, which is the backbone of the Rapid Deployment Force created to respond quickly to any threat to the oil supply lines in the Persian Gulf. The Reagan Administration feels it is demonstrating the seriousness of its commitment to the peace process by sending its best warriors to help patrol the Sinai. It has pledged that these troops will not be detached from their peacekeeping duties even if the Rapid Deployment Force goes into action. Still, there are diplomats at the United Nations and in the Arab world who fear that the MFO is merely a pretext, and that the United States is planning to use the Sinai as a jumping-off point for the 82nd Airborne to move into any trouble spot in the Middle East. These critics have only themselves to blame. When the Camp David accords were signed, both sides agreed that the Sinai border would be patrolled by a U.N. force. The logical assumption was that UNEF II—set up in 1973 after the Yom Kippur War—would remain on the spot. But as an added assurance, President Carter sent a letter to President

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Sadat and Prime Minister Begin on March 26, 1979, promising that if the Security Council failed to keep UNEF II in place, the United States would arrange for an "acceptable alternative multilateral force."

FOUR MONTHS LATER, it was clear that Carter would have to fulfill this promise. The Soviet Union, following the lead of the radical Arabs, was threatening to veto any Security Council resolution extending the mandate of UNEF II. The Carter Administration hastily worked out a compromise with the Russians, agreeing that a smaller group of U.N. observers, the Truce Supervision Organization, which has been on the scene since 1948, would take over the job.

The Israelis exploded. Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan came to Washington and accused the Administration of reneging on its promise. He argued that fifty unarmed U.N. observers could not possibly monitor the Sinai, and he objected strongly to the involvement of the Soviet Union. Administration officials backed away, explaining that it was all a misunderstanding. No final decisions had been made by the time the Reagan Administration took over. In April 1981, when Secretary of State Alexander Haig went to Cairo, Sadat gave up all hope of a U.N. presence, and formally agreed to a major U.S. role in the peacekeeping force. The Israelis were obviously more pleased with this outcome than the Egyptians. On the other hand, it could be argued that the substitution of the United States for the U.N. as the guarantor of peace—and the total exclusion of the Soviet Union—was simply the logical consequence of the policy Sadat had followed since 1972. An Egyptian nationalist rather than a pan-Arab ideologue, Sadat had one goal in mind: the return of the territory Israel had occupied since 1967.

American plans for the MFO proceeded quietly until the assassination of Sadat, in October 1981, raised questions about the future and lent a sense of urgency to the negotiations. The deadline was less than six months away and the only confirmed participants, other than the United States, were Colombia, Uruguay, and Fiji. For the next few months, Haig was involved in a three-way diplomatic battle, trying to persuade the Israelis to accept the participation of four NATO countries—Great Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands—which had made public statements favoring the inclusion of the PLO in a comprehensive peace settlement. At the same time, he assured the Europeans that participation in the Sinai force committed them only to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty; it did not commit them irrevocably to the Palestinian autonomy plan that was also part of the Camp David accords.

Haig's first breakthrough came after seven hours of talks with Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir on November 27, when he stressed that European actions were more significant than European words, and pointed out that the participation of these countries in the Sinai peacekeeping force would contribute more to the Camp David process than any number of positive statements. The verbal juggling continued until the end of January, when the dispute was finally papered over. The first units of the MFO arrived in the Sinai on schedule in late March, allowing time for an orderly Israeli withdrawal.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, it is an old rule of thumb that the solution to one problem merely opens the door to new problems. With the return of the Sinai assured, Egypt's new President, Hosni Mubarak, is interested primarily in restoring Egypt's ties with the other Arab states and the rest of the third world. He is less enthusiastic than was Sadat about the idea of an American military presence on Egyptian soil. Moreover, the Europeans have not really changed their minds about the Palestinian issue. If the autonomy talks lapse and the violence on the West Bank continues, they might reconsider their participation in the force, and the United States might find itself back where it began, with Fiji, Colombia, and Uruguay. A European withdrawal could also be triggered by a threat of war elsewhere in the Middle East, particularly if the United States decided to use its Rapid Deployment Force.

The multinational Sinai force is clearly a precarious experiment. Still, considering that the U.N. has steadfastly refused to play any role, and that the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is the most positive development in the Middle East in decades, it is encouraging that the United States has taken the lead, and persevered, despite the diplomatic hurdles. If the MFO is a success, it might even set a precedent for other allied peacekeeping efforts, especially at a time when the United States is becoming increasingly disillusioned with the United Nations and skeptical of the organization's commitment to peace.

MADELEINE G. KALB

Madeleine G. Kalb is the author of the forthcoming *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy* (Macmillan).

COMING:

The World After Brezhnev.

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In defense of deterrence.

How To Prevent Nuclear War

By Charles Krauthammer

(*continued from front cover*) the other many times over; each refrains from attacking because it fears retaliation in kind; each knows that aggression is tantamount to suicide. That is deterrence. Sometimes deterrence is called MAD, mutual assured destruction. By whatever name, deterrence has prevented the outbreak of nuclear war, indeed any war, between the United States and the Soviet Union for a generation.

Living in a world of deterrence is very uncomfortable. Every American and Soviet city dweller knows that he is targeted for destruction by nuclear weapons five thousand miles away. But the physical danger is only part of the problem. The world of deterrence is a world of paradoxes. Weapons are built in order never to be used. Weapons purely for defense of helpless populations, like the antiballistic missile systems, become the greatest threat to peace. Weapons aimed at people lessen the risk of war; weapons aimed at weapons, increase it.

The strains of living in such a world are enormous. A vast antinuclear movement is now rising in the U.S., animated principally by weariness and revulsion with this arrangement. Why now? Ronald Reagan is much of the answer. He helped defeat the SALT II treaty before his election, and has been reluctant to engage the Soviets in strategic arms talks since. For the first time in more than a decade, the U.S. and the Soviet Union are not engaged in negotiations to control strategic nuclear weapons. Worse, Mr. Reagan and some of his advisers have spoken in frighteningly offhand ways about "limited nuclear war" and nuclear warning shots. The Carter Administration's mobile MX plan played a part, too. It appeared such an enormously cumbersome and expensive contrivance that people began to wonder if the experts had not lost touch with reality. So millions of Americans have decided it is time for them to take the problem into their own hands, and an antinuclear grass-roots crusade has emerged.

Like all crusades, it has its bible: Jonathan Schell's just published *The Fate Of The Earth* (see Max Lerner's review, "Visions of the Apocalypse," on page 26 of this issue), and its banner: "the freeze." Recently it even acquired an auxilliary brigade, four members of the American foreign policy establishment who opened a wholly new front by calling for a U.S. renunciation of any first use of nuclear weapons. The bible, the banner, and the brigade approach the nuclear dilemma from different directions, but they all challenge the established doctrines of deterrence. The brigade wants to limit deterrence; the freeze proponents want to ignore it; and Jonathan Schell wants to abolish it. Each deserves the closest scrutiny.

Jonathan Schell flatly rejects deterrence. That is the source of his originality. Otherwise his three-part thesis is unremarkable. Part I restates, albeit elegantly, the awful details of a nuclear holocaust, and concludes that it would lead to the extinction of the human race. (That is the view of some scientists, though not of the National Academy of Sciences' study which Schell used in reaching many of his conclusions.) Part II, an interminable rumination on the meaning of human extinction, comes to the unsurprising conclusion that extinction would be monstrous.

"From the foregoing it follows," Schell writes, after delivering his message in a reiterative style that constitutes its own kind of overkill, "that there can be no justification for extinguishing mankind." The real interest in Schell's book lies in Part III, "The Choice." Here he argues that traditional approaches to nuclear peril, like strategic arms limitation treaties, are mere gestures, aspirin given to a dying patient. He argues that deterrence is a logical fraud because the leaders of a country that had sustained a first strike would have no reason to retaliate, indeed, no country in whose name to retaliate.

What Schell refuses to acknowledge is that any potential aggressor would be deterred—and for over thirty years has been deterred—from striking first because he must anticipate not only the logical responses of the victim, but all possible human responses. Revenge, for example, is one motive to launch a second strike. Paul Warnke, President Carter's arms control chief, gives another. He argues that "our moral commitment" would "require that the leaders who had perpetrated this enormity not be allowed to inherit the earth and bend its people to their will." Soviet leaders reading Warnke (a nuclear dove and a supporter of the freeze) are highly unlikely to calculate that a first strike would meet with no response because that would be "illogical." Furthermore, no one knows what would happen in the confused, unimagin-

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ably strained atmosphere of a nuclear crisis. To act—to attack—under the assumption that the other side is constrained to follow purely "logical" courses of action is itself totally illogical. It is precisely because of these calculations that nuclear deterrence has succeeded in preventing nuclear war. That is not to say that deterrence can never fail, but the argument from history is a powerful one. An even more powerful one is the absence of an alternative.

Not that Schell shies away from providing one: a world graced by total disarmament (nuclear and conventional), the abolition of violence, the eradication of national boundaries, the renunciation of sovereignty, and the founding of a new world political order for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. How does he propose to bring this about? That is a detail he could not work into his 231-page treatise. That "awesome, urgent task," he graciously concedes, "I have left to others."

Although he does not explain how we are to bring about a lion-and-lamb scenario which even Isaiah had the audacity only to predict and not to mandate, he does give us a clue as to what the operating principle of his post-messianic world will be. Here we come directly to the critical center of Schell's thinking, to the force that not only underlies his passion today but will save mankind tomorrow—fear. In his world, Schell writes, "Fear would no longer dictate particular decisions, such as whether or not the Soviet Union might place missiles in Cuba; rather, it would be a moving force behind the establishment of a new system by which every decision was made. And, having dictated the foundation of the system, it would stand guard over it forever after, guaranteeing that the species did not slide back toward anarchy and doom." I have my doubts.

FEAR IS NOT just the saving principle of Schell's new world order; it is the animating force behind a new mass movement—the freeze campaign. The movement demands a mutual halt in the development, production, and deployment of all nuclear weapons, "because," as the campaign slogan puts it, "no one wants a nuclear war." Like Schell, freeze proponents are deeply concerned, and rightly so, about the prospect of living in a world in which we have the capacity to blow ourselves to bits at any moment. The freeze crusade has enlisted hundreds of thousands of Americans by showing what happens if the Sword of Damocles ever drops. Thus the graphic stills of Hiroshima victims and the maps with concentric circles radiating from ground zero in everyone's hometown. Schell recognizes that removing this sword requires renunciation not just of overkill, but of minimal deterrence, of the simple capacity to destroy the other side *once*. But very few freeze proponents advocate reducing levels below "sufficiency," because they recognize that in a pre-messianic world this would destablize the nuclear balance and increase the chances of war. Under a freeze—indeed, under even the most radical of arms proposals, such as former Ambassador George Kennan's proposal to cut nuclear levels in half—the superpowers would still retain the capacity for the total destruction of the other society. Insofar as people support the freeze because they can't stand the thought of being a target for Soviet missiles, they have joined the wrong movement. The freeze offers no solution to that problem. They should be with Jonathan Schell's total disarmament movement, working on the "awesome, urgent task" of remaking human nature.

SOME MIGHT ARGUE that there is another way, short of universal brotherhood, to remove the Sword of Damocles. That is unilateral disarmament. But quite apart from the fact that such a move would mean the surrender of our values, it would do little to secure our survival. The historical record does not support the proposition that helplessness is a guarantee of safety. There has been one nuclear war on record; in it a nonnuclear Japan lost Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So far there has been only one biological war, the one going on today in Laos and Cambodia. These weapons, now used against helpless tribesmen, were never used against American troops fighting the same Vietnamese forces in the same place. The Hmong, unlike the Americans, lack the capacity to retaliate in kind.

The freeze is not unilateralist, nor do many of its advocates reject deterrence. They say they reject overkill. "Enough is enough," they say. "Why waste billions on useless weapons if all they will do, as Churchill said, is to make the rubble bounce?" (It is sometimes also argued, somewhat anomalously, that having useless, rubble-bouncing weapons is at the same time dangerous.)

The problem is that in their zeal to curb overkill, freeze advocates ignore the requirements of deterrence and, in particular, the requirement for survivability of the deterrent. Our weapons must be able to withstand a first strike and penetrate Soviet defenses in a retaliatory strike (and vice versa). If either side finds the survivability of its weapons systems declining, the world becomes less safe. In an international crisis, each side, particularly the more vulnerable side, has incentive to strike first: the invulnerable side to use its advantage, the vulnerable side to strike before it is too late.

What would happen under a freeze? The U.S. retaliatory capacity depends on the three legs of its strategic triad: the land-based ICBMs, the bomber force, and submarines. Because of the increasing accuracy, power, and numbers of Soviet missiles, the U.S. land-based missile force will soon become vulnerable to a first strike. (It is precisely to eliminate that vulnerability that President Carter proposed hiding the MX in

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multiple shelters, a scheme now abandoned.) That leaves the bomber and submarine forces. The bomber force consists of aging B-52s that are increasingly vulnerable to attack while still on the ground, and to being shot down while trying to penetrate Soviet air space. Hence President Carter's decision to deploy air-launched cruise missiles, which would be better able to penetrate Soviet defenses and would allow the B-52s to remain outside Soviet air space. The freeze proposal would prevent deployment of these missiles. It would also prevent production and development of a new bomber, either the B-1 or the Stealth, which would be better able to elude destruction on the ground and Soviet defenses in the air. Note that the B-1 or the Stealth would not be any more destructive than the B-52. They would not make the rubble bounce any higher. They would simply be more likely to get to the target, and therefore present the Soviets with a very good reason never to launch a first strike.

PAINTING BY ROBERT SOULÉ FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

That leaves the submarine force, which the U.S. is now in the process of modernizing to make more survivable. The new Tridents are quieter than existing subs, and because they have longer-range missiles they can hide in larger areas of the ocean. The freeze would stop their deployment.

The freeze, a proposal devised for its simplicity, does not deal very well with paradox. It is one of the paradoxes of deterrence that defensive weapons (the ABM, for example) can be more destabilizing and therefore more dangerous to peace than offensive weapons. The freeze fixates on nuclear weapons because they appear more terrible than others. And indeed they are. But they are not necessarily more destabilizing. As former Under Secretary of the Navy James Woolsey points out, the freeze does nothing to prevent nonnuclear antisubmarine and antiaircraft advances, which weaken deterrence. But it does prevent modernization of nuclear systems designed for survivability, which enhances deterrence.

What exactly does it mean to say that if survivability declines, war becomes more likely? One quick fix for a vulnerable deterrent is to adopt a policy of launch-on-warning: as soon as we detect enemy missiles leaving their silos, we launch our missiles before they can be destroyed. (Some officials unsuccessfully urged President Carter to adopt launch-on-warning as an alternative to building the mobile MX.) But this creates a hair-trigger situation, where the time for the world's most important decision is not a matter of minutes but of seconds, too short to check out a faulty radar reading or a misinterpretation of data. That's the price of ignoring deterrence.

This analysis looks simply at what would happen if the freeze were already a reality. But however fervently American citizens may wish it, they cannot vote a "mutual verifiable freeze" into existence. Unfortunately, that must be negotiated with the Soviets. And bad as a freeze would be as an end point, it would be worse as a U.S. negotiating position—which is exactly what it would be if, say, the Kennedy-Hatfield amendment were adopted. First, it is certain to delay other arms control initiatives. The freeze appeals to American voters because of its simplicity, but a mutual freeze would involve complex negotiations with the Soviets. What exactly would be frozen? At what stage? How would it be verified? The production, stockpiling, and qualitative upgrading of nuclear weapons cannot be detected by satellite, and the Russians have always refused on-site inspection. That problem alone turns the freeze into either a nonstarter or a source of interminable negotiation.

Ironically, there does exist an arms control proposal which, though very complicated, poorly understood by the American people, and unsuited for two-hour

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ratification by town meetings, is very well understood by the Soviets: SALT II. They have already signed it. If the aim of the freeze movement is a quick, simple, bold move in arms control that would allow us to proceed to real reductions, then the answer is not a freeze, but SALT II. Representative Les Aspin has already pointed out with dismay the American penchant for reinventing the arms control wheel every four years. In 1977 President Carter rejected the Vladivostok Accords negotiated by President Ford and proposed drastic reductions instead. The Soviets rejected his proposal out of hand. It took more than two years to renegotiate SALT II on the original lines of Vladivostok. President Reagan in turn rejected SALT II and called for as yet unspecified START talks. The freeze proponents are doing precisely the same thing. It simply makes no sense to propose a freeze that would require years of negotiations when SALT II is at hand, has already been approved by the Soviets, and could be adjusted in small details and ratified quickly. Of course, SALT is not as catchy a slogan as the freeze. But it is certainly a better, quicker, and more serious path to arms control.

ANOTHER AIM of the freeze campaign is to move to real reductions. But to arm a U.S. negotiating team with a freeze offer is to ensure that it will have no leverage with which to bargain the Soviets into reductions. We will have unilaterally announced our willingness to forgo all our modernization programs, like the Trident, the cruise missile, and the Stealth bomber. The theory is that this gesture will elicit from the Soviets a more conciliatory negotiating position. The theory is in conflict with history. The Soviets do not have a good record of responding to unilateral gestures. At the Glassboro Summit in 1967, President Johnson tried to interest Premier Kosygin in ABM negotiations. Kosygin demurred. A year later, the Senate defeated an amendment to deny funds for an American ABM system. Three days later Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko announced the Soviets' willingness to negotiate arms control. Eventually they agreed to an almost total ban on ABMs. We are using the same strategy today in Geneva, offering systems that we propose to build as bargaining chips. We offer to forgo deployment of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe if the Soviets dismantle their SS-20s. Under a freeze, our position in Geneva would collapse and the SS-20s would remain in place. (Brezhnev calls *that* arrangement a freeze.) In strategic arms talks, any attempts on our part to, say, bargain away one of our new systems against the Soviets' destabilizing silo-killing ICBMs would fail.

The freeze is not a plan; it is a sentiment. (Montana's proposed freeze resolution, for example, opposes, "the production, development and deployment of nuclear weapons by any nation." It will unfortunately not be binding on President Zia of Pakistan.) The freeze reflects the deeply felt and wholly laudable wish of millions of Americans that something be done to control nuclear weapons. But when taken seriously as a plan, the freeze continually fails on its own terms. It seeks safety, but would jeopardize deterrence; it seeks quick action, but would delay arms control; it seeks real reductions, but removes any leverage we might have to bring them about.

FINALLY, IT MISTAKES the most likely cause of an outbreak of nuclear war. In its fixation on numbers, the freeze assumes that somehow high weapons levels *in themselves* make war more likely. True, an uncontrolled arms race breeds suspicion between the superpowers and can increase the risk of war; but arms control measures (like SALT I or II) can allow higher levels, and still decrease the risk by building confidence on both sides and letting each know precisely what the other is doing. If nuclear war ever comes, it most likely will be not because the weapons fire themselves, but because some national leader, in order to preserve some national interest, orders them fired. When did we come closest to nuclear war in the last thirty-six years? In October 1962, when President Kennedy decided to threaten Khrushchev with war unless he obeyed our ultimatum on the Cuban missiles. In 1962 the level of nuclear arms was much lower than it is today. And when was the chance of nuclear war smallest? Probably at the height of detente, during the Apollo-Soyuz love fest, when U.S.-Soviet relations were good, even though each side had the capacity for multiple overkill.

The absolute level of nuclear weapons is only one factor, and a relatively small one at that, in determining the likelihood of nuclear war breaking out. (It is certainly less important than the balance of vulnerabilities on each side, i.e., the stability of deterrence.)

THE NEW REPUBLIC

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The most likely source of nuclear war is from a regional conflict between the superpowers, where one or the other has important interests, but finds itself at a conventional disadvantage. That is the American situation today in Europe and in the Persian Gulf. To prevent the Soviets from taking advantage of their superiority in conventional arms, the U.S. has reserved the option of using nuclear weapons to respond to a nonnuclear Soviet attack. This policy of extending nuclear deterrence to conventional conflicts has kept the peace. But it is dangerous. It blurs the line between conventional and nuclear war, and by threatening "limited" nuclear war it opens the door to a nuclear holocaust, since no one knows whether a limited nuclear war can be kept limited. The most effective way to eliminate that danger, and thus eliminate the greatest existing risk of nuclear war, is to make this kind of extended deterrence unnecessary: to right the conventional balance by radically bolstering allied forces, particularly on the West European frontier. NATO could then deter a conventional attack without having to threaten to wage nuclear war.

ONE OF SCHELL'S dictums is that compared to the peril of a nuclear holocaust, all other human values pale into insignificance, indeed, lose their meaning because they lose their context. If the antinuclear crusaders really believe that, they should be clamoring for increased conventional forces to reduce the European imbalance. They aren't. The reason is that the freeze crusade, which springs from deeply felt antiwar and antiarmament sentiments, is not comfortable with the thought that preventing nuclear war may require a radically enlarged conventional defense. Furthermore, one of the major appeals of the antinuclear movement is the promise to halt the economic drain caused by "useless" nuclear weapons and to redirect resources to human needs. But a shift away from strategic to conventional weapons would be very expensive. Our reliance on nuclear weapons—and the current conventional balance in Europe—results in large part from a desire to *reduce* defense spending. In the 1950s we decided to buy defense in Europe on the cheap. Rather than match the vast armies and tank forces of the Warsaw Pact, we decided to go nuclear, because, as John Foster Dulles put it, it offered "more bang for the buck."

But the European defense balance has become more unstable since Dulles's day. In the 1950s the U.S. threatened "massive retaliation." If the Soviets crossed into Western Europe, we would attack the Russian homeland with a strategic nuclear strike. When the Russians acquired the same capacity against the U.S., that threat lost its credibility. The Kennedy Administration adopted a new policy of "flexible response," a euphemism for a limited nuclear war. Under the new doctrine, the U.S. reserved the right to use theater nuclear weapons on the battlefield to thwart a conventional Soviet attack. That has been our policy ever since. (Ronald Reagan did not invent it, although he has the habit of throwing it around more casually and publicly than other Presidents.) This doctrine has troubled many Americans, but as long as the U.S. was not prepared to challenge the Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, nor prepared to abandon its European allies, there seemed no other choice.

Enter the auxilliary brigade of the antinuclear movement: four former high Administration officials, two of whom, under President Kennedy, gave us "limited nuclear war" (Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy); one of whom gave us "containment" (George Kennan); and one of whom gave us SALT I (Gerard Smith). Two weeks ago they opened an entirely new front in the crusade. They called for the adoption of a "no-first-use" policy on nuclear weapons. It was a renunciation of "flexible response" and of "extended deterrence." (They would retain extended deterrence in one restricted sense: as a retaliation for a Soviet *nuclear* attack on Western Europe, an unlikely possibility since the Soviets are prepared to renounce first use, and since with their conventional advantage they have no reason to attack with nuclear weapons.)

The problem with folding our nuclear umbrella, as the four wise men themselves acknowledged, is that, unaccompanied by conventional rearmament, it means the end of the Western alliance and the abandonment in particular of West Germany to Soviet intimidation and blackmail. The other problem with a no-first-use policy is that it might paradoxically increase the chances of nuclear war. Today a war between the U.S. and the Soviets is deterred at its origin: since even the slightest conventional conflict between them carries the threat of escalating into a nuclear one, neither happens. The no-first-use policy moves the "firebreak" from the line dividing war from peace to the line dividing conventional war from nuclear war. It trades the increased chance of conventional war (because now less dangerous and more "thinkable") for a decreased chance of such a war becoming nuclear. But no one can guarantee that *in extremis*, faced with a massive Soviet invasion of Western Europe, the U.S. would stick to its no-first-use pledge. Thus, by making a European war thinkable, this policy could, whatever its intentions, lead to a nuclear war.

UNLESS, THAT IS, we have the conventional forces to preserve the original firebreak between war and peace. Thus, to prevent both political and (possibly) nuclear calamity, a no-first-use pledge must be accompanied, indeed preceded, by a serious conventional buildup of Western forces on the European frontier. The problem with McNamara et al is that although they acknowledge this need, they treat it very casually—certainly with nothing like the urgency with which they call for abandoning extended deterrence. They speak only vaguely of the need for

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"review" and "study" of conventional military needs, of whether the political will exists in the West for such a build-up, and of "whether we Americans have a durable and effective answer to our military manpower needs in the present all-volunteer active and reserve forces" (they cannot quite bring themselves to say the word "draft"). Their eagerness to be the first off the blocks with a no-first-use policy is obvious. Their reluctance to urge on their antinuclear allies the only responsible and safe (and costly) means of achieving it is lamentable. The result of their highly publicized, grossly unbalanced proposal is predictable: another support in the complex and high vulnerable structure of deterrence has been weakened. The world will be no safer for it.

Despite the prophesies of Schell, the pandering of the freeze-riding politicans, and the posturing of the four wise men—and the good intentions of millions of concerned Americans caught up in the antinuclear maelstrom—there is no need to reinvent nuclear policy. There *is* a need for arms control: SALT II is the best transition to real reductions. There *is* a need to avoid limited nuclear war: rebuilding our conventional strength and perhaps reintroducing the draft would reduce that risk. These proposals are neither new nor exciting. Unlike Schell's crusade, they don't promise to restore "the wholeness and meaning of life." They don't suggest that "the passion and will that we need to save ourselves would flood into our lives. Then the walls of indifference, inertia, and coldness that now isolate each of us from others, and all of us from the past and future generations, would melt, like snow in the spring." They don't promise to set right "our disordered instinctual life." That is because working to reduce the chances of nuclear war is not an exercise in psychotherapy. It is not a romance. It is mundane work in pursuit of mundane objectives: a modest program of nuclear modernization, SALT II, and a bigger conventional defense. These measures will not cure anomie, but will help to maintain deterrence, that difficult abstraction on which our values and our safety depend.

The Republican Party after Reagan.

JACK AND GEORGE

BY FRED BARNES

IF YOU ACCEPT them at their word, Vice President George Bush and Representative Jack Kemp are perhaps the only Republicans in America who have ruled out the possibility that they will be rivals for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1984. "I haven't thought about it," says Bush. President Reagan is going to seek a second term, he insists, and "I think it would be good for a lot of reasons. It's good because I believe in what he's doing. And there's something to be said for the continuity, the eight years." Go for the Presidency in 1984? "I'm not even thinking about that," echoes Kemp. "My assumption is the President will run and the Vice President will run and they'll be there until 1988."

Perhaps, but not many Republicans think so anymore, and the Reagan-won't-run speculation has prompted allies of Bush and Kemp to begin chatting up—but not plotting—plans for 1984. "The general supposition among Republican leaders now is that Reagan won't be a candidate," says a Republican Congressional leader who confers regularly with the President. "That job is going to grind him down. Nancy will want to leave. And he'll have done all he could reasonably be expected to do." Reagan's retirement would automatically catapult Bush and Kemp into the race, and there might be more candidates as well: Senate majority leader Howard Baker, Presidential pal Senator Paul Laxalt, Senator Jesse Helms, Secretary of State Alexander Haig. But Baker's lackluster bid for the White House in 1980 has left a pall over his Presidential prospects, and few regard Laxalt and Haig as serious contenders. Helms, the commander-in-chief of the new right, could attract significant conservative support, but right-wing leaders have been informed privately he will seek Senate reelection in 1984, not the Presidency.

That leaves Bush and Kemp pitted in what bears some signs of the old moderate versus conservative struggle that has defined Republican Presidential contests for decades. "The shirts versus the skins," columnist Mark Shields calls it. Certainly moderates would

Fred Barnes is national political correspondent for the *Baltimore Sun*.

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cluster around Bush, just as they did around President Gerald Ford in 1976. Hard-core conservatives would rush to Kemp, as they did to Reagan. But there are rather glaring aspects of a Bush-Kemp race that don't fit the moderate-conservative stereotype. Bush is a moderate only when judged by new right specifications; by any other measure, he's a conventional conservative. Kemp isn't a conventional conservative, pursuing as he is the goal of a "populist consensus." On social issues Bush and Kemp are nearly identical. They favor school prayer and oppose busing. Bush advocates ratification of the ERA; Kemp voted for it in 1971. On foreign policy, there are shades of difference. Both are hardliners, but Kemp is more vocally pro-Israel. And he is more critical of foreign aid, advocating the export of more capitalism and less capital.



DRAWING BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

The outcome of a Bush-Kemp race "would probably depend on where a lot of the Reagan people went," says Stuart Spencer, the Republican strategist and Reagan guru. Where, for starters, would Reagan himself go? His habit in the past has been to stay out of primary fights. But he and Bush have become quite comfortable together. At the Gridiron Club dinner in Washington in March, Bush mentioned to Reagan that he was having a few folks over for supper the next evening. Want to join us? he asked. The President showed up, with Nancy in tow, and stayed for hours. Bush is, after all, the President's most unswerving defender. He is fond of saying in speeches that Reagan's only crime is "that he's done as President precisely what he said he'd do when he was running for office." Even Bush's conservative antagonists acknowledge his loyalty to Reagan. "I can't fault him for that," says Terry Dolan, the head of the National Conservative Political Action Committee.

In a campaign against Kemp, Bush has what one adviser calls "a built-in advantage." He also has two problems, either of which could be fatal to his Presidential ambitions. The advantage is that he "has an organization he can put back together again," a Bush strategist says. "He's shown he can run a national campaign and raise money for it." Take Iowa, scene of the first Presidential skirmish in February 1984. "George has a hell of a base there," this strategist says. At the top of the shadow Bush organization is an impressive array of old-line Republicans, Reagan aides, and aggressive young operatives. White House chief of staff James Baker is unlikely to manage Bush's campaign again, but he would surely be a senior adviser. So would Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, Washington attorney Dean Burch, White House spokesman David Gergen, and William Draper, the head of the Export-Import Bank. Texas oil man Robert Mosbacher would be available once more as finance chairman. Robert Teeter, the respected Republican pollster, and David Keene, the conservative political consultant, remain close to the Bush camp. A flock of younger Bush associates are sprinkled about the Administration. David Bates, a trusted campaign aide in 1980, is at the Commerce Department. Jay Moorhead works for the White House personnel office. Peter Teeley, one of the more politically sensitive Republicans in Washington, is Bush's press secretary. And the de facto boss of the Republican National Committee is Rich Bond, a Bush man. He would be political director of a Bush Presidential campaign in 1984, a Bush associate says.

The problems confronting a Bush campaign are the Hubert Humphrey syndrome and the rift with the new right. Humphrey, as Lyndon Johnson's Vice President in 1968, found it all but impossible to forge a credible balance between loyalty to the President and pursuit of his own political interests. For now, Bush has settled for lock-step conformity with Reagan's views to the point that he sought recently to expunge the idea he had ever used the term "voodoo econom-

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ics" to characterize the President's supply-side dogma. Bush denied ever employing the phrase in his 1980 campaign, and he challenged "anybody to find it" in television tapes of his speeches. To Bush's chagrin, Ken Bode of NBC News uncovered a speech in Pittsburgh in which Bush disparaged "a voodoo economic policy." Four years of fealty to Reagan, however, "should inure to Bush's benefit if Reagan is very popular in 1984," contends a Bush adviser. "Reagan could be quite popular with Republicans even if his overall popularity isn't that high. And if Reagan isn't popular, Bush can distance himself a little. It's going to be very difficult to do this, though."

John Sears, the one-time Reagan campaign manager, argues that the Vice Presidency is simply a poor launching pad for a Presidential campaign. "We have proven that it's more than a little difficult for an incumbent President with all the naked political power at his disposal to get renominated," Sears says. "One would wonder whether a Vice President would fare very well when he stands one step removed from the power a President can muster but is just as responsible for the policies. He can't say if he has a difficulty with what's going on." All true, concedes a Bush strategist. "But remember one thing. Humphrey got the nomination. And he came damn close to winning the election in a year when the Democrats were horribly split."

THE ANTIPATHY toward Bush by right-wing zealots could be dismissed as unimportant if Bush had the Republican nomination in hand. The new right isn't that big a factor in the general election. But the Republican Presidential nominating process is dominated by conservatives. "If you're not straight with them, you're in trouble," says David Keene, the lone Bush ally with ties to the new right. Clearly, Bush is in trouble here. To assuage the right-wingers, he has adopted the lame posture that some of his best friends belong to the new right. "Some individuals I can think of in the new right, I feel quite close to politically," he says. "I have respect for them. I don't agree on everything with them. We agree on a lot." Keene claims that Bush has an opportunity to clear his name with conservatives. "George could be the most vocal of the Reaganites while others are taking shots at Reagan," Keene says. "It's time for him to raise his profile in defense of the President in particular and on conservative issues in general. While new right leaders might not be swayed, a lot of conservative voters could be." Terry Dolan is among those not likely to succumb to conservative rhetoric from Bush. "I didn't vote for Gerald Ford in 1976," he says. "I couldn't vote for a Gerald Ford clone."

Where Bush is weak, Kemp is strong. "If Jack Kemp were to announce for President tomorrow, I'd support him," says Dolan. "Almost all brands of conservatives would feel comfortable with him. He might not agree 100 percent with anybody, but he's got so many overwhelming advantages as a candidate that people are willing to overlook the minor differences. He's like Ronald Reagan is in many respects. He could sell refrigerators to Eskimos." While the new right denounces Bush for every deviation from conservatism, Kemp is given extraordinary latitude. He was among the first House Republicans to advocate extension of the Voting Rights Act, yet no complaints from the new right ensued. He voted for full voting rights for District of Columbia citizens and against the Awacs sale to Saudi Arabia. He opposes right-to-work laws, which aren't popular in his Buffalo district, and campaigned in 1978 for then-Representative John Anderson, who was under right-wing attack. Not long ago, he flew to Connecticut to endorse Prescott Bush, George's brother, for the Senate. For that gesture, he drew no criticism from conservatives, and he received a phone call with warm thanks from the Vice President.

Kemp has courted the new right, speaking recently to Paul Weyrich's Kingston Group and appearing on "The 700 Club" of television evangelist Pat Robertson. But most of the considerable time he spends on the road is devoted to stirring the Republican faithful with a messianic plea for free-market economics. Kemp has been delivering basically the same message since the mid-1970s, and it has brought him a large following in the Republican Party. Bush evokes cheers when he lauds Reagan before Republican audiences, as he did in March when he claimed at the Lincoln Day dinner in London, Kentucky, that the President "has restored a sense of dignity and decency and a concept of honor to the White House." Kemp, in contrast, touches off thunderous, sustained applause by praising limited government and unbridled capitalism. "We shouldn't measure the compassion of government by how much it does for people, but how little it has to do for people because they're able to do it for themselves," Kemp told delegates to the South Carolina Republican convention in early April. It took more than thirty seconds for the clapping and whistling to subside.

KEMP'S FLAIR for free market oratory—cut taxes, ease regulations, return to the gold standard—has made him the most sought-after Republican speaker next to Reagan. "It looked like we were going to have a quiet convention," said George Graham, the South Carolina state chairman. "The key to putting some life in the convention was having a lively speaker—Kemp." After Kemp spoke, Greenville city councilman W. D. Workman III declared him "a Yankee but still a good ole boy." Bush? "He's highly respected, but he's not our kind of folks," Workman said. "He doesn't talk our language." Kemp had the same effect in Wyoming last February, when he spoke at a Lincoln Day dinner. "A damned impressive performance," said Representative Richard Cheney, who was chief of staff in the Ford White House before

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returning to Wyoming and running for Congress. "My guess is Wyoming's not unique," he said. "There's no reason for Wyoming to have an affinity for Jack Kemp—he'd never been in Wyoming before—unless he has a national following." Kemp's prolific speechifying has also brought him the chairmanship of the House Republican Conference. He was elected entirely through support from Republican freshmen and sophomores for whom he had campaigned in 1978 and 1980.

Unlike Bush, Kemp has been able to open some ideological breathing room between himself and Reagan, though he has tried to do this without jeopardizing his access to the President. He has developed a sort of populist conservatism that preaches the virtues of capitalism while criticizing corporate America. He and Representative Trent Lott of Mississippi, his closest ally in the House, excoriated budget director David Stockman last winter for urging tax increases for "the little guy" instead of trying to eliminate "corporate welfare." During a Washington seminar in March, Kemp unleased his populist pitch on an unsuspecting Democratic Senator, Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, who favors dropping the final 10 percent of the tax cut for individuals. "Senator Hollings's plan presides over the largest corporate tax cuts in history, cuts taxes for executives earning $111,000 and above and yanks the rug from under the average guy," Kemp roared. "That may be good politics in South Carolina, but in Buffalo it's lousy politics and rotten economics. The Senator seems to believe the economic problem today is that Buffalo steelworkers didn't pay enough taxes in 1981. That's economic lunacy." Kemp has also gotten populist mileage out of his scheme for enterprise zones in decayed inner cities. He recruited a coalition of black and Hispanic representatives to back the idea, then pressured the Administration into proposing its own enterprise zone plan. And he insists that a new monetary policy that moves toward a gold standard and eases the current credit crunch is a populist stance. "Honest money is a populist, blue-collar, middle-class, bread-and-butter concern," he says.

If Kemp is ideologically daring, he is breathtakingly cautious when it comes to personal political planning. He balked at running for the Senate, not to mention for the Presidency, in 1980 and for the governorship of New York this year. These stepping-stones to the White House are unnecessary, an adviser says. "You can run for President from the House, easily," the adviser adds. But at this point, Kemp has no organization. "There is no way Kemp can out-organize Bush," a Kemp strategist admits. "His organization in a Presidential race would have to come by inheriting Reagan's mantle." Only three of his political advisers—Jeffrey Bell, Roger Stone, and Charles Black—have experience in a Presidential campaign. All worked for Reagan, with Bell and Black leaving when John Sears was fired as Reagan campaign chief in early 1980. Kemp's closest aide is David Smick, a former Democrat from Baltimore with political connections in Maryland. Smick is an ardent supply-sider who encourages Kemp to emphasize populist themes. So do Kemp's other supply-side advisers, namely Bell, who is now running for the Senate in New Jersey, and Jude Wanniski, the former *Wall Street Journal* writer who was instrumental in popularizing supply-side economics. Kemp talks frequently with Irving Kristol, and has been heavily influenced by him.

WITH HIS single-minded emphasis on supply-side economics, Kemp would seem to invite blame for the failure of Reaganomics to ignite an economic boom. Lurking ominously in the neighborhood of Kemp's Presidential hopes is "an economic problem," says a Bush adviser. "Kemp's disadvantage is he's tied to things that haven't gone down as well as promised," adds Keene. After all, Kemp is Reagan's mentor on economics, and he recommended the deep tax cuts that have lost popularity, especially on Capitol Hill. With the recession enduring, says Senator Robert Dole, "sooner or later somebody is going to sort out what happened. Jack's not even for cutting spending. I don't know how long you can sell that." Asked if Kemp might win the Republican nomination, Dole declares, "I can't believe that would happen."

Dole notwithstanding, Kemp is in the process of dodging the bullets. If Republican senators fault him for bad economics, grass-roots Republicans don't seem to. Kemp is "stronger than horseradish," said a Southern state chairman following a Kemp speech in his state. Kemp's explanation for the current economic woes is simple: rather than reeling from too much supply-side economics, it is suffering from too little. The tax cut for individuals should have started sooner and been heftier, he says. And Paul Volcker's misguided monetarism has constricted the economy so much that a credit crunch has resulted, driving up interest rates. "Gold convertibility may not be fashionable," Kemp told a Federal Reserve conference in Atlanta in March. "But I am convinced it is imperative. . . . Without delay, the Administration should propose legislation to define the U.S. dollar again as a fixed weight of gold, and to provide for the convertibility of Federal Reserve notes and credit into gold on demand." Kemp concedes he didn't talk about monetary policy much last year when tax cuts were being billed as an economic wonder drug. "I did not mention it as much as I should have," he said. If this explanation flies, Kemp is going to be a formidable figure in 1984. He thrills Republican throngs in the same emotional way as Reagan does, and Bush can't match it. "Tell Kemp we'll agree right now to give him the Vice Presidential nod," a Bush aide declared. He was joshing, but it is a bargain that might do more for Bush's Presidential chances than any amount of reflected glow from the Reagan Presidency.

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STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

In Baltimore, For Instance

American men hate to grow up. I don't know any other national literature that has produced national epitomes comparable to *Huckleberry Finn* and *The Catcher in the Rye*, novels that are not only about the condition of being young but about its superiority. Our best dramatist wrote one of his most durable plays, *Ah, Wilderness!*, about lost innocence. It's hardly a surprise that this state of mind has marked American films: a few examples are *Summer of '42*, *September 30, 1955*, *Breaking Away*, and, my favorite to date, *American Graffiti*. The last is especially interesting because its director, George Lucas, subsequently made *Star Wars*, which is a projection onto the future of the *American Graffiti* ethos, the ideals and tastes of boyhood and adolescence in the past impasted on the space age to come.

Diner
(MGM/United Artists)

Underneath this American male hatred of maturity—and what sets it apart from, for instance, Peter Pan's refusal to grow up—is the American male's hatred/fear of women, which translates readily into the deer-park mentality: women as the hunting preserve of men; manhood proved by expedition *and return*. Clear signs of contemporary change in these attitudes are growing, but those attitudes in their earlier, pure state are the locus of *Diner*, written and directed by Barry Levinson. It takes place in 1959. The setting is Baltimore, presumably because Levinson grew up there, but it could have been virtually any American city or sizable town in 1959.

Diner has been loudly acclaimed—for two reasons, I think. The first is extrinsic: the picture was finished over a year ago, and for a year its owners and distributors have fiddled with it. Levinson and some loyal supporters fought for an appropriate release, and at last they won. They deserve congratulations on their courage, especially since *Diner* turns out to be a good picture, funny and observant, hardly earthshaking but well worth seeing. (In the last few years most of the completed pictures that have had trouble in getting release have only proved, when seen at last, that the distributors were right.)

The second reason for the cheers is that *Diner* is one of the youth celebrations described above, and there's nothing that brings a greater reaction of relief-plus-joy from American critics and public than a good film in that genre. How pleasant it is (the tone of the reception implies) to have a good new American film that rolls right down the middle of the alley, a film that is simultaneously enjoyable and reaffirming. We can admire it without being disturbed in any way, without having our imaginations stretched or our experience enlarged. No good film gets as rousing a welcome as one that doesn't "cost" us anything, and a good youth film is a bull's eye.

Here they are again, the young pals—six of them this time, in their early twenties this time—complete with their "headquarters"—a diner this time—kidding one another, chasing and comparing girls, reveling in popular culture. In fact they delineate themselves, just as a painter would use oils and canvas for a self-portrait, by their use of girltalk and pop-cult talk. Their language comes to them less from parents and schools than from pop music, sports, and films. (Hollywood films, naturally. Two of the youths go to an Ingmar Bergman festival—though 1959 seems a bit early for that in Baltimore—and the predictable gibes get gibed.)

The six principals are a mixed lot, of course, but not so ostentatiously mixed that we can see the hand of a movie chef selecting ingredients. All are middle-class, though some are on the wealthier side. Some are Jews, some are not. One of them is already married and already regrets it because he can't talk to his wife the way he can talk to his pals with whom he hangs out almost as much as if he were still single. (What this says about his parents and about what's going to happen to his sons *or* daughters is scary.)

Some of the film's sequences, much praised by now, are apparently destined to become points of reference, less because of their novelty than because of the non-novel verity under the fresh approach. One fellow, engaged, refuses to go through with the marriage unless his fiancée can pass an exam on the history of professional football (to which his father contributes questions!). The already married fellow quarrels hotly with his wife because she misfiled his record albums and because, worse, she doesn't understand how important it is to know what's on the flip side of hit records. For me, there was an even more memorable sequence in which another fellow takes out that album-muffing wife, with whom he used to sleep before she was married, both to restore her dimmed feeling of sexual allure and—which she doesn't know—

FILMS WORTH SEEING

Mephisto. A leading German actor (based on a real-life figure) changes politics and wives in order to prosper under Hitler. The film doesn't grow from a personal dilemma to a general agon, but it's vivid, atmospheric, memorable.

Passione d'Amore. Nineteenth-century Italy. A strange triangle: handsome army officer, beautiful mistress, most unbeautiful "other woman" who finally captures him. A romance that rigorously examines romanticism.

Victor/Victoria. Blake Edwards directed and based his script on an old German comedy. Result: a witty, fast farce about transvestism and homosexuality in Paris, 1934.

A Week's Vacation. A young woman who teaches in Lyons withdraws for a week to clear her view of her present and her future. Quiet, firm, touching work by Bertrand Tavernier, who made *The Clockmaker*.

SK

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to win a bet. She's willing to visit his apartment, but at the last moment he can't go through with it.

The script has sequences that burden its general infectious ease with movie guff: a faked car accident as a practical joke; a scene in a strip bar; one fellow's tight fix with a tough professional gambler and his miraculous rescue; that same fellow's encounter with a society girl galloping around her estate outside Baltimore. (The blonde equestrienne has something of the same allegorical function as the elusive blonde in the white T-bird in *American Graffiti*.) These "scripted" moments stick out because the texture of the rest is so casually credible.

All the leading actors are relative newcomers, all are attractive. Possibly the best known are Mickey Rourke, who was the professional arsonist in the otherwise deplorable *Body Heat*, here a reticently strong, secret idealist; Kevin Bacon, now playing Off Broadway in *Poor Little Lambs*, as a hard-drinking, secretly intellectual daredevil; and Steve Guttenberg, of the unspeakable *Can't Stop the Music*, as the affianced football nut. These three and their friends play together like an ace basketball team. (All right, so it's a six-man team.)

Levinson's previous writing has been collaborative: on Carol Burnett shows, Mel Brooks pictures, and the Pacino film, *And Justice for All*. His dialogue, when it's written dialogue and nothing else—like some sequences between one young man and a pregnant young woman—can get a bit starchy; but when he throws the ball to the team and lets them *go*, when the dialogue overlaps and undercuts and gushes in sidewise repetitive vernacular—in short, when Levinson has been shrewd enough (apparently) to let his actors improvise on given materials—the talk has vitality and shape. This is the kind of dialogue that American realistic actors do best; still it can be done badly, and here it's done well. This is Levinson's first directorial job; he handles it as if it were his tenth. I could have done without the ritual obeisance to Edward Hopper in a shot of a nighttime diner, but on the whole, the film is smoothly made, precisely pitched.

Diner is knowingly dated in more than its date; its tone is unremittingly sexist. What men want and how they want it is the basic law of the society shown. The engaged girl *agrees* to the football examination and studies for it. The young bride's hurt ego is restored when her former boyfriend assures her that she was a good lay and that she is still sexy. I don't begin to believe that these attitudes—in young men and in the response of young women—are now obsolete in the U.S., but it's patent that, since 1959, great changes have shaken the basic law cited above, largely through social, educative process and partly, I think, for physiological reasons. The Pill, added to those cultural causes, has changed young women's attitudes toward sex. The combination of causes has inevitably altered the old deer-park, hunting-preserve sexual attitudes of young men. Sexual behavior is much more egalitarian now—in some social groups, anyway, in some parts of the country. By 1992 *Diner* may have become an historical document.

Several commentators have compared *Diner* with Fellini's *I Vitelloni*. This

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seems to me obtuse. Fellini's masterpiece (1953) deals with the economic-spiritual paralysis of a nation, as manifested in a group of young men who drift around their hometown simply and only because they can't find work—at least, work that holds any promise or interest. *Diner* is about a group of very comfortable middle-class young men busily creating memories of freedom to take with them into the involvement, advancement, probable success that lie ahead of them. They know that this is the happiest time of their lives; Fellini's youths know it is the unhappiest.

Levinson himself, looking back at Baltimore in 1959, inferably thinks it was the best time of his life. Engaging and enjoyable as *Diner* mostly is, it's still one more case of an American disease.

VISIONS OF THE APOCALYPSE

The Fate of the Earth by Jonathan Schell

(Knopf, 244 pp., $11.95)

Jonathan Schell's book, *The Fate of the Earth*, measures finally the full dimensions of the great blinding truth of our time—that a nuclear war might lead to the extinction of the human species. But exactly because it is blinding he—and we—may be too dazzled by its light to see the problem whole. There have been thousands of commentaries on what this new destructive power of man means: but my guess is that Jonathan Schell's book, which first appeared in three installments in the *New Yorker* several months ago, will become the classic statement of the emerging consciousness. It is a mix of technical information on nuclear destruction and ecological fallout; philosophical reflections on the extinction of the human species; and a (too brief) discussion of the political choices that lie before us.

Summarized thus, Schell seems to have added little to the "extinctionist" school of the European antinuclear movement. Yet that would miss the power and distinction of the writing. Schell indicts us for living in everyday ways with a limited awareness of the monstrous fact that we are making, storing, and talking of using the weapons that may mean the end of human life on earth—and yet we are failing to bring that awareness into full consciousness. This is what a book important for its time does: it takes our view of ourselves and the world, which we have come to take for granted, and turns it around and around, so that facets of the familiar take on a bizarre strangeness without ceasing to be familiar. You read the book and say, "But this is obvious." Yet it is by its very obviousness, freshly broken through into our consciousness, that Schell's message achieves its shattering presence in our minds, never to be dislodged. Writing at the height of the nuclear arms spiral, within the framework of spreading antinuclear movements, Schell has cut through the accustomed crust of our awareness.

History is happening to Jonathan Schell's book and it in turn is likely to happen to history. Only rarely has a book made political history on a scale as grand as this one seems destined to. It was true of Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* before the Civil War, of Zola's *J'accuse* at the time of the Dreyfusards, of John Maynard Keynes's *Economic Consequences of the Peace* after World War I. There is a similar vatic quality about Schell's book; it speaks from and to the spirit that seems to have seized our time—the deep undeniable stirrings among millions of every political persuasion. However formidable the book's grisly calculus of death and its involved ruminations, there is also a note of passion that meets the passion of the reader.

But Schell's style, his insistent impulse to draw simplicity out of complexity, can also be trying. Schell casts a wide net and, as he pulls in the gleaming, irradiated fish he has caught, he tells us, over and over again, their "simple" meaning: that we may be extinguishing life on earth and dooming future generations. The strength of the book, and also its undoing, rests thus on the imaginative hold it secures on us by always reaching for the *total*. Schell is both absolutist and apocalyptic. There are no partial truths for him, only total ones.

Nowhere, it is true, does he say in his initial section, "A Republic of Insects and Grass," that a nuclear war *will* level all life on earth. He is instead careful to list a sequence of *mays* (and all are only *mays*): "There *may* be a holocaust, the adversaries *may* use all their weapons, the global effects (in the ozone) *may* be severe, the atmosphere *may* suffer catastrophic breakdown, our species *may* be extinguished." (In one case, Peter Sharfman, who did a Congressional study of nuclear war in 1979, has criticized Schell's handling of an important technical study of the effects of a large-scale war, saying that "the bottom line of the Academy of Sciences report is the exact opposite of Schell's bottom line"; the Academy's report concluded that human life will survive the largest nuclear war.) Nonetheless the succession of Schell's *mays* adds up to a *will*, even a *shall*; the total impact of Schell's technical chapter is to establish a certainty in the reader's consciousness—and in the author's. "If these effects should lead to human extinction," he ends the chapter, "then all the complexity will give way to the utmost simplicity—the simplicity of nothingness. We—the human race—shall cease to be."

IS THIS HYPE? It doesn't have to be. The reality contained in each particular *may* is bad enough without turning them all into one grand *shall*. The weight of the evidence seems to be that a Soviet-American nuclear encounter could kill scores of millions in each nation, maim scores of millions of others, bring life to a standstill. Still, to speak confidently of total annihilation is to take a leap. In fact the Soviet leaders are still betting on a civil defense system, which would seem to deny the annihilation assumption, and the vision of a total ecological collapse along with it.

What Schell says is that we can't afford to gamble on the *mays* remaining *mays*. As a matter of policy he is right. The American and Soviet leaders will have to reckon with the possibility of total extinction, and it is bound to concentrate their minds mightily. Yet having once protected his flank by his *mays*,

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Schell moves on with his *shall*, and bases the last two-thirds of the book on it. From this point on the *mays* no longer exist.

This becomes his ultimate paradigm, developed in Part II—"The Second Death." Schell's nightmare vision doesn't stop with the extinction of the present generations: it goes on logically to the denial of life to all future generations, which for him adds an even heavier moral burden since it wipes out the future and is a blow to human generativity itself. "Extinction," he writes, "is a second death, and this second life (that of the unborn) is the life that it destroys." It is a blow also to historicity and to all three tenses, since (here he draws on Hannah Arendt) the past exists only in the memory of the present, and the present only in the memory of the future, and the present and past as well, since there will be no witnesses to either. Thus we wipe the slate clean not only of human life but of the human memory which is the necessary witness to that life.

Schell's vision is powerful and penetrating, as he traces the material dimensions of doom and, even more, as he explores the terrain of the imagination —what will happen to science, morality, love, marriage, generativity, fear, art, history, good, evil, life, death, *after* the doom has struck. But the author's account of how mankind can avert doom is limited and uninventive. Schell is so involved with tracing the consequences of his holocaust scenario that he has little space left to explore the central difficulty of how to *prevent* nuclear war.

It is one thing to point out, as Schell does, that none of our missile strategies and deterrence theories contains ways of stopping short of ultimate annihilation and that none can even assure either side of the capacity to "win" a war. It is quite another to brush them aside for that reason, and fail to reckon with the reality principle in them that is linked to the aggressive-destructive drive manifest in men's struggles with one another over the span of man's history. It isn't a question of "blaming" the weapons and strategies of their contrivers, but of seeing their relation to man's psychic nature.

When Schell is finally compelled to confront this dark truth of history, he does it not as a psychological but as a moral problem—that of "radical evil" (the phrase is Kant's). He defines the prospect of nuclear war as a "crime against the future," and quotes Hannah Arendt's pronouncement that totalitarian terror means the end of politics as we have known it. "A victory of the concentration camp system," wrote Arendt, "would mean the same inexorable doom for human beings as the use of the hydrogen bomb would mean the doom of the human race."

This almost cuts the ground from under Schell's thesis that there is nothing in human experience comparable to nuclear death. He tries to retrieve his ground: "Yet we must insist that in fact extinction by nuclear arms would be the more profound oblivion, since then the very possibility of remembrance or renewal would be gone." But "the more profound oblivion" is a metaterm, seeking the declension of the absolute, as one might say "the more nothing nothingness." It is characteristic of how rigidly Schell clings to his central vision not only for itself but as the measure of everything in life and death that falls short of it. That for him genocide

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

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should have become secondary, where for Arendt it was primary, is a sign of how far he has adopted an apocalyptic vision. In moral and psychological terms genocide was—if the differences can be measured—in one sense worse than nuclear death. It was the consequence of *intention* on the part of the Nazi leaders. By contrast, in the post-Hiroshima era, no nuclear weapon has been used by either camp, and the two superpowers have deliberately avoided a direct confrontation in conventional war, doubtless for fear of its escalating.

What Schell fails to recognize, enthralled as he is by his eschatology, is that no plan for averting a nuclear holocaust is worth anything if it doesn't acknowledge the deeply flawed nature of man and his institutions. We have had to live with evil and destruction since the start of humanity. We have been living in the presence of the possibility of a nuclear holocaust for only a few decades, and we don't know how many more decades we will have before we learn how to cope with it. Urgency is important, but knowledge and wisdom are even more important.

Part of that wisdom lies in understanding what it is that dehumanizes us. It isn't the indifference of people to their common plight but the opposite—enthusiasm. It is when a people has been most strongly seized with a rage of commitment—to nationalism, racism, religious fanaticism—that it is most likely to succumb to its own fervors and to the cold calculators who mean to use them. The fatal human flaw is not radical evil in Schell's moral sense—an original sin—but the capacity of the human psyche to fix on some grand idealized goal and pursue it with a single-minded zeal that excludes no means. If history has taught us nothing else it should have taught us that.

What Schell doubtless meant to do was to light a fire in our minds—not to destroy others, but to save mankind itself. There are hundreds of other "nuclear fear books" being published with the same intent, although not on the level of Schell's philosophical abstraction or moral depth. They may succeed in their aim of marshaling imagination; but will they, singly or together, bring us closer to preventing the holocaust?

Thus far, in the dangerous and delicate world of deterrence strategies and counterstrategies, the terror in the face of nuclear war has operated to give the Russians a big advantage. That is as much a fact of recent history as any of the facts in Schell's analysis of blast and radiation effects. The fallout from the antinuclear campaigns in Europe has hobbled NATO's unity and paralyzed the best intentions of Western leaders to build a defense against Soviet arms. The chief allies the Russians have today are intimidation and fear, riding across Europe like two gaunt horsemen—intimidation by Russia's military prowess and fear of the nuclear arms in both camps. In America, where the antinuclear fervor has thus far been less than in Europe but is growing, this book is bound to increase it.

Rather than save us from the destructive power we have in store, Schell's scenario threatens to undermine the actual, constructive values we draw strength from now. The heart of the "civil religion" of the West is the freedom-happiness mix which Jefferson celebrated as the "inalienable rights" of men. Yet Schell's entire "dependency logic"—that all values depend on the prior existence of life and that nothing can be of value if human life itself is in question—cries out that freedom, and all rights and values, must be secondary if not irrelevant before the prospect of human extinction. This is a curiously self-defeating argument in a book which aims at salvaging human love, work, and generativity, and which would itself have no chance of changing minds anywhere but in free societies. To feel—as Schell is convinced readers will feel—that freedom, equality, happiness, and law are expendable luxuries, is to strip free nations of their strongest weapon, more powerful than any military weapon: the values that have inspired support at home and abroad.

The full impact of the "extinctionist" antinuclear movements will be felt in the democracies, not in the Soviet Union. Like the rest of us, Schell has a glimmer of hope that some of the antinuclear fervor will seep over from the West into the East. Yet he knows full well that the democracies will have to bear the moral burden—and the risks—of the antinuclear movement. Which means that for the immediate future it is their defense systems, not those of the Russians, which will suffer. Only the governments of the West will be vulnerable to the



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storms of antinuclear protest.

It is worth noting that Schell nowhere confronts the "better Red than dead" issue head-on, nor the logic which has led millions in Western Europe to endorse certain surrender rather than perilous freedom. His own policy choices—an arms freeze, SALT negotiations, arms reduction, total disarmament—require bilateral negotiation and action. Schell himself does not favor unilateralism. The problem is that his logic leads inexorably to it. Each of the courses of action I have listed, and all of them together, will take time. Yet according to Schell's own testimony, time is what we don't have, since the current deterrence strategies are fearfully dangerous and an unintended nuclear episode could end in a holocaust. If mankind's survival is the one overarching value, as Schell claims, he is hard put to refute the case for unilateral disarmament by the West.

Consider this in the light of Schell's central paradigm and of the book as a whole. If everything else pales in the face of species survival, why risk struggle, conflict, uncertainty, elections, political shifts, the wild vagaries of personality and accident? True, unilateral disarmament by either side is most unlikely. But the swiftest assurance of human survival would be for the West to strip away its arms and let the Soviets take over. They could be counted on to maintain peace over their world empire, even if it were the peace of silence and surrender. The Soviets would achieve a nuclear monopoly, since China could scarcely hold out against them, and with that monopoly they could ensure the suppression of any budding attempt to challenge them.

Given the logic of the subordination of all other values to that of species survival, one must put the hypothetical question again: why not a voluntary nuclear disarmament or one forced on the governments of the West by their people? The answer is, of course, that, whatever the fear of death, we cannot as human beings give up the hazards, testings, and values of life.

WHAT IS of value in Schell's analysis is the passion with which he has looked into the heart of darkness. What is of less value is his effort to create a new norm—the "extinctionist" or "survivalist" one—by which to measure everything: life, death, love, freedom, politics, first and last things, the heavens and earth and everything between them. Life is an ongoing process, full of dangers (including the ultimate one) but also full of love and joy. As human beings have created the weapons, tensions, and dilemmas that beset them, so they must muster the wisdom and resourcefulness—yes, and the courage—to cope with them. As long as we can lead our lives, it is best to lead them without being drenched in fear. Schell's first draft included a good deal about political contrivances that he finally cut out, preferring to leave policy discussions to public debate. He contents himself with a cryptic, "We shall have to reinvent politics"—which is true enough, but not much help.

Of one thing I am certain. Whatever the course we take, it must be without mass marches and parades, and without hysteria. Fear can prod us out of indifference, but that is no longer the problem. When it comes to political inventiveness and wise, far-reaching decisions, fear is a sterile force.

MAX LERNER

Max Lerner is a syndicated columnist and professor of human behavior at U.S. International University at San Diego. His books include *America as a Civilization* (Touchstone Books) and *The Age of Overkill: A Preface to World Politics* (Simon and Schuster).

THE ARGUMENT FOR THE STATES

The Complete Anti-Federalist edited, with commentary and notes by Herbert J. Storing with the assistance of Murray Dry

(University of Chicago Press, seven volumes, $175)

As the bicentennial of the United States Constitution approaches, we may be permitted a certain amount of national self-congratulation. The Constitution has proved to be the most durable frame of government possessed by any major power in the world today, and it has furnished more reliable safeguards for human liberty than most other governments. The Constitution has been a success. It deserves to be celebrated.

All the more reason, then, for intellectual generosity toward those who feared it would be a disaster and who helped to add to it some of the safeguards that have made it a success. The late Herbert J. Storing was an admirer of the Constitution, but he was so impressed with the quality of the initial opposition to it that he collected for publication the newspaper articles and pamphlets in which the so-called Antifederalists urged its rejection and demanded amendments. The editorial work was incomplete at the time of his death, but it has been finished by Murray Dry, and the whole now appears in seven volumes, the first being Storing's introduction (also available in a separate, paperback edition, *What the Anti-Federalists Were For*, $4.95), and the last an extensive index. The other five volumes contain not only the principal Antifederalist writings but a selection of speeches in the state ratifying conventions, including the powerful ones by Patrick Henry in Virginia and Melancton Smith in New York.

The introduction is a brief but incisive summary and analysis of the Antifederalist arguments. Storing admits that the Antifederalists lost to the Federalists "not merely because they were less clever arguers or less skillful politicians but because they had the weaker argument." It was nevertheless an argument or set of arguments that affirmed enduring libertarian values and addressed problems that continued and continue to confront the government created by the Constitution. Storing presents the arguments succinctly, and a reading of the documents he collected justifies his and his publishers' assurance that they are still worth attention.

To be sure, since this is the "complete" Antifederalist, it contains plenty of hysterical predictions that must have seemed farfetched even at the time they were uttered. A common one, for exam-

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ple, arose from the power the Constitution gave to Congress to fix the time and place of elections to the House of Representatives: Congress would require people in Massachusetts to vote in Georgia, it would require everybody to vote at the national capital, it would put an end to elections altogether, and so on. But along with such turgid denunciations (which would be matched by equally absurd encomiums on the other side), there are searching essays that deserve a place beside those that Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote for the Federalists.

What the whole collection makes plain is that the 1780s were indeed a "critical period," perhaps (excluding the 1860s) *the* critical period of American history. The central issue was whether Americans would be one people with a national, or several peoples united in a limp, federation that was steadily losing the powers it had exercised in the years before it was acknowledged to have any power at all (the Revolutionary War was nearly won before the Articles of Confederation were agreed to in 1781). It was not, however, simply a question of strengthening or creating a national government. The Antifederalists were willing to strengthen the existing federation. What they feared was the annihilation of the state governments and of the popular liberties that they thought the state governments could protect and that the proposed national government would not or could not protect.

In his introduction Professor Storing has properly focused on "what the Antifederalists were for," because previous historians have focused on what they were against. What the Antifederalists were for was a union of states rather than people and a simple, minimal central government with wide popular participation and safeguards for traditional popular rights. But in order to appreciate the Antifederalist position, it may here be worth recalling that what the Antifederalists were for was not entirely synonymous with what the Federalists were against. And what the Federalists were against animated both sides.

SINCE THE Constitution was the product of compromises that blunted the purpose of its principal authors, what the Federalists were against appears more clearly in their writings and speeches than in the provisions of the Constitution itself. The architect of the Constitution was James Madison, and what moved Madison and his supporters at the Convention was not merely the weakness of the national federation but the iniquity of the state governments. Though he proposed a national government in part as an end in itself, as the political expression and guardian of national identity, he also proposed it and designed it as a means of curbing the vicious propensities of the states. If he and his friends had had their way, the national government would have had an absolute veto over all state laws.

What bothered the Federalists most about the state governments was their failure to protect the rights of property, and in particular the rights of creditors. After winning a war against British threats to American property through taxation, the states themselves seemed bent on destroying the security of American property through laws that made depreciated paper money a legal tender or that declared a moratorium on collection of debts. And state governments that held firm against these destructive measures were defied by mobs that closed the courts in order to stop collection of debts. The Federalists wanted a national government that would be strong enough to put down such insurrections and to see that state legislatures did not yield to any other pressures inimical to property rights.

Madison, who not only designed the Constitution but wrote the classic defense of it in the *Federalist Papers*, was far less pleased with the finished document than he indicated in those essays. Writing to Jefferson on September 6, 1787, just before the Convention broke up, he thought that the Constitution, if adopted, would "neither effectually answer its national object nor prevent the local mischiefs which every where excite disgusts against the state governments." In a later letter, when the secrecy imposed by the Convention was lifted, he explained why: because the Convention had rejected his pleas for a veto power over state laws, the national government would not be able to prevent the local mischiefs. And he even went on to give his opinion that

> the evils issuing from these sources [the state governments] contributed more to that uneasiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform, than those [evils] which accrued to our national character and interest from the inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects.

If Madison's opinion was correct, curbing the states was more important in the minds of Americans (as it seems to have been in his) than strengthening the nation.

THE PRINCIPAL evils that the Federalists (and many other Americans) were against, then, lay in the states and the state governments. Federalists were unable—and some would have been unwilling—to do away with the state governments altogether. But they wanted a central government strong enough to interdict state actions. Madison did not think that the Constitution would provide such a government. Neither did Hamilton. But they recognized that the Constitution would give them more leverage against the states than they had had in a Continental Congress with no coercive powers at all. They were willing to settle for what they could get.

In the light of what the Federalists had aimed at (which, despite the secrecy of the Convention proceedings, was widely known or suspected), the reaction of the Antifederalists will appear somewhat less paranoid than it does when one approaches their writings cold. They thought that the national government proposed in the Constitution would destroy the state governments and that that was the intention of the framers, as indeed it may have been of some. Madison did not get his veto over the states, but to the Antifederalists it looked as though he had got far

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too close to it. The Constitution made national laws and national treaties the supreme law of the land. Did that not amount to an overriding of state laws? The Constitution forbade the states to issue paper money or to make anything but gold and silver a legal tender or to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, but it did not forbid these things to the national government. Nor did it reserve to either the states or the people the powers not expressly delegated to the national government. There was no general bill of rights specifying what the national government could not do. In the absence of such a limitation, and under cover of its constitutional authorization to provide for the general welfare and to do whatever was necessary and proper to carry out its functions, the national government would be able to do almost anything. And whatever it did would be the supreme law of the land. In the face of this leviathan the state governments would be helpless. They would soon wither away, and liberty would wither with them.

Such fears were not groundless. And they were aggravated by the very widely publicized speech given in Pennsylvania by James Wilson, Madison's chief ally at the Convention. Wilson argued that the Constitution needed no bill of rights because it specified the things that the national government could do, and thereby excluded the doing of anything unspecified. In every state the Antifederalists rose to demolish Wilson's argument by reversing it. The Constitution specifically prohibited some things to the national government, such as bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and thereby (to follow Wilson's reasoning) permitted the doing of anything unspecified. By inference, the Constitution granted to the national government all powers not specifically excluded.

BY THEIR insistence on a bill of rights to limit the national government, the Antifederalists were able to add to the Constitution, in the first ten amendments, much of what they were after. But they thereby added little that the Federalists were against and nothing that removed their own deepest fears. Madison himself drafted the amendments. It was almost as though the Federalists had deliberately omitted a bill of rights in order to be able to disarm their opponents with this concession (there is no evidence that such a strategy was intended). What no bill of rights could answer was the fear of the most thoughtful Antifederalists that a national government by its very nature, by virtue of the size of the area it governed, would be incapable of recognizing, or responding to, the needs of the people it governed. In their ruminations on this danger the Antifederalists went to the heart of the problems inherent in representative government, and it is here that their writings deserve the attention that this edition of them makes possible.

It was a truism in eighteenth-century political thinking that republican government could not be extended over a large territory. Montesquieu, the political philosopher most frequently cited in support of this proposition, had argued that republican government thus extended would fall prey to factions and become aristocratic or oligarchic. If it escaped such a transformation, it would break up into a series of smaller republics. The only way to have republican government in a large territory was through a federation of such small republics, united only for dealing with countries outside the federation. That, of course, was what the United States already had under the Articles of Confederation.

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

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

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As is well known, Madison was prepared to cope with Montesquieu's argument. Taking his cue from a casual remark of David Hume's, Madison turned the argument on its head, to show that republican government was better suited to a large territory than a small one. According to Madison a large territory had two advantages over a small one: it would contain a larger number of able men from whom the inhabitants could select their governors, and it would contain such a variety of different and opposing interests (factions) so widely spaced, that no combination of them would be able to agree on measures that might oppress the rest.

Madison's argument is perhaps the most significant contribution to political thought by any of the Founding Fathers, and it is the foundation of subsequent pluralist political thought. But it made small impression on the Antifederalists, who indeed took surprisingly little notice of it. While they occasionally cited Montesquieu in their arguments against the Constitution, the Antifederalists relied much more heavily on the long-cherished American conception of representative government that prompted and sustained colonial resistance to British taxation, and finally directed the formation of their new state governments. That conception was one that could not be squared with Madison's

REPRESENTATIVE government has always embodied a paradox, not to say a contradiction. Representatives were originally the agents of particular communities, empowered to meet with a superior governing power in order to convey the assent or dissent of their constituents to new laws and taxes imposed from above. Representatives were more the attorneys of other subjects than a part of the governing power. As representatives gradually assumed or usurped the powers of government (a process not yet complete in either England or America before 1776), they had to think and act as rulers, not only for the communities that chose them but for the whole society of which their communities were a part. Yet they remained the agents of their constituents; they had to think and act both as subjects in a local community and as rulers over a much larger society. The history of representative government is the history of the conflict between these two functions, neither of which can exclude the other.

Americans in 1787 were still close to the original representative function. A representative in American experience had almost always been someone who was familiar with the needs of his community, someone the people in it knew and trusted and sent off to the government to look after their interests. And a representative assembly was supposed to be a mirror of the various communities that participated in it. It was a substitute for an assemblage of the whole people. It should therefore be, as John Adams said, "in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them." When the British Parliament began taxing the colonies in 1764, Americans had accordingly complained not only that they *were* not represented in Parliament but that they *could* not be. Distance forbade it. They could not be represented because a representative sent to London would be out of touch with his constituents and therefore unable properly to convey their views and look after their interests. He would not be able to think, feel, and act like them at so great a distance.

England actually had no intention of allowing Americans to send representatives (it was suggested but not seriously considered). Instead, England responded to the American charge by affirming in absolute terms the other aspects of representation, emphasizing the function of representatives as governors, as a kind of elective aristocracy. Americans, it was said, might not actually vote for members of the House of Commons, but they were nevertheless represented there in the same way as most other British subjects, most of whom could not vote: they were "virtually" represented. Virtual representation meant that every member was discharged from local responsibilities and charged with looking after the running of the whole society. He represented everybody. To Americans this was so ridiculous as to be scarcely worth answering. One might as well say that Parliament represented the whole world (a proposition that may not have seemed wholly absurd to Englishmen of that day). And Americans declared in no uncertain terms that the only persons who represented them were those whom they had elected to their own representative assemblies.

The quarrel with England thus reinforced the Americans' emphasis on the local character of representation, the representative's attachment to the community that chose him. It was representatives schooled in this traditional concept who assumed nearly all powers of government in America, once the break with England was made. Fresh from proclaiming local autonomy against the superintending power of king, Parliament, royal governors, and governors' councils, they had now themselves to exercise or direct whatever overall superintending powers there might be. To the Continental Congress (which was not popularly elected and thus not a representative assembly) they would

THE GARROTTED MAN (GOYA)

As if fixed by a long habit of thought
his mouth is turned down, one eye
half open, dreamy. Like the posture
I love, seated and leaning back,
legs stretched out when I am most
at ease with myself, my friends.
His is the moment of rest of the passionate man
who dreams he is superior to rest.
The collar and the rope are like
insignias of a religious order,
Franciscan, Carmelite. A cross is jammed
in his clasped hands—they are tied
and rest gently on his lap.
His body seems as well accorded
as his soul—the shoulders fallen
in easy repose. Only the feet tell:
this is the terminal scene we struggle
to look at, the difficult knowledge, intimate
stranglehold, death at home in the body.
His toes are spread, curled, rigid
in a splay of agony—his whole
body's last lashing out for air.
If they could loosen! and loosen here
my clenched mind from its dead stare.

BARRY GOLDENSOHN

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allow no coercive powers, and in the state governments they subordinated all other branches—governors, judiciary, and upper houses—to themselves in their representative assemblies. As a result, even at the state level, larger, long-term concerns were sacrificed, and at the national level the Continental Congress lost the grudging support given it under pressure of war. Hence the local mischiefs which troubled Madison and his friends so much, and which even the Antifederalists acknowledged.

WHAT THE Antifederalists would not acknowledge was that the way to overcome the mischiefs was through a supreme national government in which representation as Americans understood it would be nonexistent, a national government that might reduce the states to impotence and thus effectively demolish true representative government everywhere in the United States. The kind of representation proposed by the Constitution for the national government looked several degrees worse than what the colonists had renounced and denounced in the quarrel with England. If Americans could not be properly represented in the British House of Commons, no more could they be in a national House of Representatives. America was a large and growing country. The capital would be too far away for proper representation of most parts of it. And, to compound the difficulty, the Constitution proposed a House of Representatives so small as to suggest a deliberate repudiation of what Americans had always demanded in their governments. In the British House of Commons five hundred and fifty-eight members inadequately represented six million people. The Constitution provided for a House of Representatives that would initially contain only sixty-five members to represent three million people spread over a much larger territory than England, and future houses were not to contain more than one representative for every thirty thousand persons. The first United States House of Representatives would be smaller in size than most of the state representative assemblies. Double the number, triple it, the situation would be improved, but not much. In order to have the ratio of representation Americans were accustomed to, the House would have to seat two thousand, a veritable mob, incapable of deliberating about anything.

As the Antifederalists saw it, the consequence of any attempt to extend representative government to so large a country as the United States must be an instant aristocracy or oligarchy. Admit with Madison that there would be a large pool of talent from which to draw representatives, it was not talent that was needed in a representative but familiarity with the situation of the people he represented. If he was going to think for them, he ought to think like them. And anyone who was well-enough known to thirty thousand people to be elected to Congress was not going to be someone who would think like most of them. He was going to be a man of reputation, someone who had been born to wealth and position or who had climbed or clawed his way there over the bodies of people who did not think or feel like him.

OR ADMIT with Madison that the United States contained a great variety of people with a great variety of interests; would that variety be embodied in a House of Representatives of sixty-five men or one hundred and thirty or even two hundred, a size that most Americans of the time seemed to consider maximum for effective deliberation? On the contrary, to the Antifederalists it seemed likely that they would be all of a kind, the kind that could be designated "natural aristocrats." The United States did not have and would not have a hereditary titled aristocracy. The proposed Constitution forbade it, just as the Articles of Confederation had forbidden it. But that did not mean that some men were not much richer, more powerful, more looked-up-to than the rest. The most thoughtful Antifederalist pamphleteer (the anonymous "Federal Farmer") estimated the number of such men in the whole country at four or five thousand. From those five thousand, the Antifederalists predicted, the members of Congress would inevitably be drawn. Lesser men, the middling sort of farmers, mechanics, and tradesmen, would not be known widely enough outside their immediate neighborhoods to win the necessary votes. No representative would embody their interests. In order for a representative body to be a picture of the people represented, it had to be chosen from small districts, small enough so that the people would all be acquainted, so that they could vote for men like them-

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selves, whom they knew personally and not simply by reputation. Such small districts were possible in elections for a state legislature, but on a national scale they would produce too large an assembly to be workable. A national government, though representative in form, would have to be unrepresentative in fact. It ought not, therefore, to have the extensive powers that the Constitution proposed for it. It ought to be subordinate to the state governments.

Were the Antifederalists wrong? Was Madison right? Yes and no. Representative government of the kind the Antifederalists valued in the state governments was clearly what Madison did not want in the national government, and the fact that the size of the nation would eliminate that kind of representation was, for him, all to the good. Attachment to local interests was what he hoped the national government would overcome; natural aristocrats were just what he wanted in the national House of Representatives. But the men he encountered there a few years later were not quite what he had expected, and he was not altogether happy with the way they behaved. Nor did he find them as varied in their interests or as unable to agree in oppressing others as he had predicted. Fortunate for him that he did not succeed in securing a national veto over state legislation, for by 1798 he was trying for a state veto over national legislation.

Fortunately he did not succeed in that either. Representative government is bound to disappoint those who expect too much from it—or too little. It is merely not as bad as other, more rational kinds of government, whether in a small territory or a large. It requires that representatives think sometimes the way Federalists wanted them to and at other times the way the Antifederalists wanted. And despite Antifederalist fears, national representatives have somehow managed to carry on this balancing act. They did not all turn out to be natural aristocrats (can we doubt that mediocrity is fully represented among them?). They did not annihilate the state governments. They did not become, in the long run, any more menacing to civil and political liberties than their counterparts in the state governments. Often they have protected those liberties when the states failed to. They did not, then, quite fulfill the Antifederalists' fears. Not did they quite fulfill the Federalists' hopes. And just as well. In republican government a shutout victory is not a good thing.

EDMUND S. MORGAN

Edmund S. Morgan is Sterling Professor of History at Yale and the author, most recently, of *The Genius of George Washington* (Norton).

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

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Critical Observations by Julian Symons

(Ticknor & Fields, 213 pp., $12.95)

This review is written with something less than full Arnoldian disinterestedness, since the last of these essays mentions me by name in the course of describing "A Year in Academe." But the reason I valued Julian Symons enough to suggest that he teach writing for a year at Amherst College was that he is a particularly interesting and distinguished instance of the man of letters, as flexible and diverse in his approaches to things as Arnold wanted critics to be. More than that, flexibility and diversity are, in Mr. Symons's case, an indication of his freedom from any particular critical theory or system. He neither indulges in ax-grinding, nor does he put forth any group of writers as having a monopoly on literary virtue. His very vocabulary is free from the modish trappings of academic-literary big talk; he doesn't valorize closure nor worry about recuperating the text without privileging it, and he even calls them "books" rather than "texts." He isn't a post-post-structuralist, or not so you'd notice. To suggest what he *is*, before turning to this most recent of the forty-odd books he has written, a short account of his career may be in order.

Born in 1912, he grew up in Clapham, South London, youngest child of four, the oldest of whom was A. J. A. Symons, author of *The Quest for Corvo* and eventual subject of one of his youngest brother's best biographies, *A. J. A. Symons: His Life and Speculations* (1950). Julian Symons left school at age fourteen, worked during the 1930s as secretary for an engineering company in Pimlico (they sold secondhand dynamos) and as an advertising copywriter. But—it may come as a surprise to readers who associate him mainly with crime fiction—his real vocation was poetry, a book of which (*Confusions About X*) was published in 1938 when he was also editing *Twentieth Century Verse*, a lively and serious little magazine. His literary heroes —and in retrospect he appears to have chosen well—were Auden, Orwell, Wyndham Lewis, writers who combined high awareness with a fascinated distrust of politics, especially as it informed novels, poems, and essays. The war came, Symons married, did a hitch in the army, published his first crime novel in 1945, and two years later became a freelance writer, in which pursuit—except for that lone year in academe—he has since been occupied.

The fruits of that occupation are im-

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pressive. Best known of them are the twenty-one crime novels, which in addition to their executive skill (one feels always the professional hand at the wheel) are attractive for their knowing intimacy with the textures of life in London, from Soho to Clapham, or with the sort of meal one might be served at a not-too-classy English boardinghouse by the sea near Brighton (tomato soup, thinly sliced cold meat and salad, ice cream). If this atmosphere recalls Graham Greene, there is little of Greene's depression and none of his religion; in fact the novels are memorable for their comic comeuppances, for the many ways their heroes are embarrassed over the course of the book. A reader unfamiliar with them might begin with *The 31st of February* (1950) and *The Man Whose Dreams Came True* (1968), then move on to more recent ones, *The Blackheath Poisonings* (1978) and *Sweet Adelaide* (1980) —these last two are Victorian reconstructions—to encounter Symons at his best. Along with the novels, he wrote a number of biographies and social histories, the best of which are of Carlyle and Poe, and of the 1930s in England. *Mortal Consequences* (1972) is a full, always critically intelligent survey of detective novels and crime fiction. There are also a number of short stories, poems, and radio and television plays.

Along with all this output, there has been steady book reviewing for various newspapers and magazines here and in England; the book at hand represents a small selection of reviews from the past fifteen years (a previous 1966 collection, *Critical Occasions*, was never published in this country). In the opening essay, "Something About a Namesake," he writes about the now pretty well forgotten Arthur Symons (pronounced Simmons in both namesakes) that his criticisms of writers, the drama and music "all have a feet-on-the-ground-shrewdness"; that the sensibility is always "in the service of common sense"; and that for all Arthur Symons's protestations that he hated "logic," "the qualities that come through in his criticism are preeminently those of a rational, logical man." Very much the same thing should be said about the later Symons in describing the accurate characterizations and evaluations he makes of books, writers, little magazines, and old literary friends like Ruthven Todd and George Woodcock. (*Critical Occasions* contained memorable portraits of Orwell, Lewis, and Laura Riding.)

On occasion the rational logical man, whose sensibility operates in the service of common sense, can rise to a fine irritability when confronted with his opposite, the example of which in this book is Edith Sitwell, whom Symons thoroughly takes to pieces both as a poet and a critic. He names exactly right "the facetiousness that for her has always passed for humor," and then provides examples of her critical foolery and pretentiousness, like this one on Sidney's famous double sestina, "Ye Goatherd Gods." The work, we are informed, "has a strange hive-humming music, like that of shepherds' pipes, and this changes, sometimes, to a dark drumming sound, like that of great drops of water falling over the rocks of a forest cavern" (Symons wonders how many times Dame Edith heard those great drops falling). To demonstrate the silliness of her "technical" criticism (how the "A" sounds mix with the "W" sounds to create Beauty) he mixes up two instances of hers with two of his own, the latter written in ten minutes: they are of course indistinguishable. He is willing to allow some slight merit to her early poems but hears in the later ones the voice of somebody who has felt "how important it is to feel deeply, and has expressed her awareness of this importance by crying out continually at the top of her voice," thus giving the sense of "continuous intoxication." But though Symons is no admirer of Sitwell, he can also criticize the stridency in her enemy, F. R. Leavis, as when (in a fair-minded review of the reissued *Scrutiny*) he notes that Leavis speaks "as if Cambridge were a metropolis and London a troublesome unconquered province several hundred miles away." "Such illusions are dangerous," remarks the nonacademic London literary man, but he ends up praising Leavis for his "narrow, but deeply perceptive and forceful, mind" and for the way his magazine "changed the whole critical climate of Britain in relation to literature."

Symons is a pre-Symbolist critic insofar as he still likes to have the words of a novel or poem "relate" to something outside themselves. So he prefers Yeats's symbols to Edith Sitwell's because they at least pretend to have "reference" to reality; while praise of Geoffrey Grigson as a sharp critic goes with only moderate interest in Grigson's po-



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ems, the words of which usually "do not relate to anything outside themselves." And I think it not just coincidence, or the vagaries of book reviewing, which dictate the list of novelists he writes so well about in this volume: C. P. Snow; Kingsley Amis; the barely known Frances Newman and the earliest pre-modernist Wyndham Lewis; thriller-writers like Simenon, Christie, Chandler, and Hammett. All these novelists are interested more in the outsides of things than their insides, in the look and feel and smell of things and people, rather than their innermost thoughts; they explore society rather than the psyche, London or Los Angeles rather than inner precincts. One of his complaints about *Scrutiny* is that its editors thought neither Trollope nor Thackeray worth discussing even once in the twenty-one years of the magazine's life.

That thus ignoring Trollope should provoke Symons is not surprising, since (in *Critical Occasions*) he has written at some length and with admiration about that unmodernist master of the middle style. And in *Notes From Another Country* (1972), Symons's engaging memoir, he says at one point, with surprising directness and force, that "the thing I regret most in my life is the lack of deep and high creative talent as a writer." But perhaps only someone assured about the breadth and extent of his talents could lament that they were no higher or deeper. With Symons it is the range of subjects, the presence always of a strongly vivid and humorous irony, the ability to be both self-deprecating and stubborn about his judgments (most notably stubborn with regard to William Carlos Williams, in whose poetry he can see no merit), most of all the honorable persistence for over thirty years in recording critical, biographical, and fictional observations, which make him such a valuable resource. Like Trollope, and like the Orwell he wrote about so affectingly, Julian Symons is a master of the middle style, and a prime contemporary example of The Writer—in Orwell's words, one of "the minority of gifted, wilful people who are determined to live their own lives to the end."

WILLIAM H. PRITCHARD

William H. Pritchard teaches English at Amherst and is the author of *Lives of the Modern Poets* (Oxford University Press).

UNCLE SAM'S WARS ON CRIME

Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief Justice of the United States

U.S. v. Crime in the Streets by Thomas E. Cronin, Tania Z. Cronin, and Michael E. Milakovich

(Indiana University Press, 256 pp., $17.50)

Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime (1981)

In national politics, violent crime is a political candidate's dream but an incumbent's nightmare. Running for office, the candidate confronts a national consensus against crime in the street. Once he is President, the issue before him is no longer whether the American public would rather not be mugged, but what the federal government can do about street crime. The answer that has emerged over the past fifteen years—encompassing Democratic and Republican Administrations alike—is that the federal government cannot do much.

Why is American national government Prometheus-bound when it comes to control of street crime? The central problems are two. The first, while important, is elementary. At any level of government, there is an inherent limit to the capacity of Western democracies to control crime without sacrificing the freedom of the general citizenry. Combining urban interdependence with Western liberty is a risky task in Europe as well as the U.S.

But American federal government operates under an additional handicap unknown to other nations. The division of power between different levels of government in the United States stacks the deck against direct federal initiatives to counter street crime. American national government has a limited criminal justice role with few parallels in the developed world. Aside from drug smugglers and bank robbers, street crime in the United States is the province of local police, county courts, and state prison systems.

A few comparative statistics make the point. The United States has more than half a million accused or convicted criminals behind bars—but fewer than one in fifteen is in the federal system. In fact, the state of Texas has a larger prison system than the federal government. And prisons are only the beginning. Decisions to arrest, prosecute, and send to prison are even more decentralized than prison administration in the United States. Here, cities and counties make the decisions while state governments pay the prison bills. In criminal law enforcement, there is nothing new about the "new federalism," but much that frustrates the electorate.

The essential frustration is that crime is a national problem without a federal solution. All three documents under review reflect this tension. Chief Justice Burger, speaking to the national dimensions of the problem, frequently sounds more like a pastor exhorting the Moral Majority than a federal official.

What are the solutions to this crisis?

> We must not be misled by clichés and slogans that if we but abolish poverty crime will also disappear. A far greater factor is the deterrent effect of swift and certain consequences: swift arrest, prompt trial, certain penalty, and—at some point—finality of judgment.

This statement is remarkable, and not merely because the Chief Justice prefers one set of clichés ("swift," "prompt," "certain penalties") over those postulating the relationship between poverty or unemployment and crime.

More important for present purposes is the sequence of remedies proposed for crime in the streets. Can Washington influence the speed and number of arrests for street crime? This is a matter, above all, for local policing. And a decade-long battle to increase even slow arrests has proved quite frustrating. Further, when speaking of robbers,

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muggers, and burglars, the matters of prompt trial and certainty of sanction are the province of county government or state legislation.

The only street crime countermeasure mentioned in the excerpt that is susceptible to federal control is what the Chief Justice calls "finality of judgment." He is referring to federal law that currently provides the opportunity for convicted and usually imprisoned defendants to petition federal district judges for review of the legality of their convictions in state courts. However burdensome review of these petitions might be, the end result is a trivial trickle of state prisoners released because of successful challenges to previous convictions. I suspect the inclusion of this extraordinary remedy for crime reflects more than judicial self-protection. A wise man recently observed that if the only tool one has is a hammer, a surprising number of problems might appear to require nails.

The evangelic tone of the Burger crime message is more than a reflection of the Chief Justice's personality; sermons must serve where power to effect change is lacking. And lack of power to effect change is not limited to the judicial branch of the federal government. In the war on street crime, the Attorney General of the United States serves at the mercy of the local county prosecutor.

THE CURIOUSLY titled *U.S. v. Crime in the Streets* is a semischolarly, well-written, and thoughtful history of the rise and fall of what was known as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. In little more than a decade, this 1960s creation dispensed about $7 billion to other levels of government to fight crime. Was it a good fight? The authors, while justifiably critical of the substantive, political, and bureaucratic machinations of the agency, rightly refuse to characterize the federal financial war on crime as a categorical failure. Some progress was made in a number of areas. Even the rather heavy component of waste owes as much to the restrictions of the federal system as it does to the often pathetic, sometimes hilarious episodes recounted in this history of the dollar war on crime.

One essential lesson of this book is that the federal government, as a 10 percent partner in direct crime control, can only bring about limited changes in the institutions that control the other 90 percent of traffic. One option is to attempt to teach by example, by running federal law enforcement, court, and penal institutions that are demonstrably successful and lead the way to state and local innovation. The federal court system, well funded and not overwhelmed by enormous case loads and accompanying squalor, has done this for a number of years. But because of the special circumstances surrounding federal criminal jurisdiction, the lessons that states and localities should learn are frequently not clear. If the federal system is faced with an overload of cases, it can always push substantial numbers of defendants back to state and local criminal justice by declining to prosecute under federal statutes. Where should the states send their overload? And if the federal Congress generously funds its own institutions, what does this teach about where financial support should come from for state and local criminal justice reform?

THESE QUESTIONS give rise to two competing federal funding options that have dominated recent debate. One approach is to use federal funding as an incentive to push state and local governments toward reform consistent with federal standards. This is federal funding with "strings" attached, a strategy often used in areas as diverse as welfare reform, urban housing, job programs, and other "categorical" national programs that rely on state and local initiative.

By contrast, a block grant or "no strings" approach to funding apportions federal dollars according to criteria such as population or crime rate and allows substantial discretion about how federal aid dollars will be spent. This "block grant" approach is not logically inconsistent with the federal government's role as an exemplary in criminal justice reform. Instead, so the argument goes, it leaves the states and cities free to choose among a variety of examples based on their superior wisdom about local conditions and needs.

Now if one views the career of the Law Enforcement Assistance Association as a war about money, one battle in it was between the advocates of federal standards and those of the no strings persuasion. While the federal standards proponents won on a few issues, the block grant philosophy dominated the dollar war on crime. The second battle was between the cities and the states for the federal criminal justice dollar. This was a somewhat less one-sided affair; over time, however, the states emerged victorious.

Where did the money go? Much was spent on layers of bureaucratic waste and pointless planning exercises. Other money was spent on helicopters and communications equipment for police. Large sums financed criminal justice activities that otherwise would have been supported by state and local funds. Still, a fair amount of innovation did take place. Federal money may not have lowered the crime rate, but decency and efficiency in the administration of criminal justice was measurably enhanced by the national government's investment in state aid. It is only when measured against the promise of achieving crime control that the enterprise seems a total failure. But it was this promise that elicited Congressional support. Failure to achieve the unachievable led to the termination of the first substantial federal dollar initiative in support of state and local crime control. And the fiscal austerity of the early 1980s does not suggest early return of federal financing earmarked for state and local law enforcement.

OR DOES IT? Violent crime is an inescapable national issue and free federal options are few. One wonders how long the public can subsist on a diet of Presidential pep talks about the need for changes in national mood or proposals to cut back the scope of constitutional protections accorded criminal defendants. An early indication of the tension between the crime issue and limited federal aid is revealed in the *Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime*, which was issued late last summer. This four-month effort comes advertised as a list of sixty-four recommendations for the Attorney

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General's war on crime. The proposals range from modest tactical plans to off-the-shelf law-and-order bromides such as reducing the number of times illegally seized evidence can be excluded from criminal trials. But paging through this document, it is not difficult to get to the heart of the matter: a proposal (summarily rejected by an Administration spokesman) for $2 billion in federal aid to state prison construction. And $2 billion is only the tip of the iceberg. State prison population has increased by more than half in the past decade, and the conditions of confinement in the average state prison are deplorable. Even in an era of budget cutting, how long can the national government keep its purse strings closed with prisons, the only crime countermeasure with wide public support, in crisis? Perhaps not so long as many believe.

HISTORY SUGGESTS that crime control will be a multibillion dollar agenda item in relatively short order, either as a conservative bid for state aid in prison construction or as a liberal strategy to assist cities in the ever more expensive enterprise of policing. At this writing, city governments are the focus of growing public demand for more police protection while state governments are feeling more of the heat for the prison crisis. It would be remarkable if public dissatisfaction did not spill over to the federal level—and soon.

A sense of limit is needed if the next generation of federal efforts is to avoid self-destructive promises that federal money will cure crime. Clear federal priorities are the only protection against the capacities of state and local government to swallow limitless amounts of money without showing measurable change. And priorities must be enforced by the discipline of adherence to national goals in the face of political pressure. These I take to be the lessons taught by Professor Cronin and his colleagues. They deserve a wide audience.

FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING

Franklin E. Zimring is professor of law and director of the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago and the author of the recently published *The Changing Legal World of Adolescents* (Free Press.)

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

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

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WASHINGTON DIARIST

Curious Codes

GREAT BRITAIN has long prided itself on possessing a code of honor, and still dusts it off from time to time. The code was on display last week, when the Prime Minister praised Lord Carrington's resignation as "a matter of honor." "I was wrong in the assessment of what [the Argentines] were doing, and therefore I am responsible," the Foreign Secretary announced. "I think it is right that I resign." Mrs. Thatcher dressed up this clipped resignation statement in ye olde English fashion, lauding her "sturdy and bonny fighter for Britain, and a very gallant officer whom we shall miss," as Lord Carrington repaired to the safety of the House of Lords. More than a few in Parliament, though, were of the view that she wouldn't miss her gallant officer half so much as she'd miss her own bonny office, and they loudly let her know it. To Americans, the parliamentary pandemonium was an alien spectacle, since few of our policymakers ever dream of resigning when their policy has failed. Our code of honor is quite different. Here the rare occasions of conspicuous resignation are provided by those few brave bureaucrats who have relinquished their jobs to protest *someone else's* policy. And it's generally only when that someone else's policy is failing that such resignations are made especially conspicuous, dressed up puritan style—Elliot Richardson, for example, in the Saturday Night Massacre. If the protested policy is still in general favor, the mavericks tend to slip out of office quietly—Robert McNamara, for example, departed "in need of rest" in 1968. Given the high degree of party discipline in the British parliamentary system, this dextrous American style of protest by resignation would be largely beside the point over there. But to judge from Watergate and Vietnam, the British art of bowing out when a policy is bollixed could come in handy over here. There's a chance, for instance, that the prospect of resigning over a policy failure might concentrate our policymakers' minds: they might well discover a sense of responsibility and courage somewhere within. At the very least, if our policymakers had to depart with dispatch after a failure, they would be saved from the terrible temptation to deny the failure, or disguise it, or lay the blame for it elsewhere, or try all three tactics—surely a nightmare to fear more, as Richard Nixon must know, than failure itself.

EVEN MORE REMARKABLE than the stamina shown by tainted officials who resist resignation, though, is the long-suffering patience often displayed by those who appointed or elected them. Four-term Representative Frederick W. Richmond of Brooklyn, New York, has enjoyed an especially supportive relationship with his constituency, one stronghold of which is my predominantly liberal, affluent hometown, Brooklyn Heights. Mr. Richmond has demonstrated an uncanny sense of what sins will play back home. In 1978 he admitted to trying to buy sexual favors from a sixteen-year-old black youth. Criminal charges against him were dropped when he agreed to undergo counseling; his constituents broad-mindedly harbored no grudge against him and voted him back into office. Now a grand jury is investigating Mr. Richmond's role in arranging a clerical job in Congress for an escaped convict; but don't count the Representative out yet. He may figure that back home in Norman Mailer's old neighborhood, few citizens will be the least bit surprised that their Representative, who has demonstrated his devotion to the cause of art (he's chairman of the Congressional Arts Caucus), should also prove to be dedicated to helping criminals. As for more tedious charges—financial misdealings involving his political campaigns—those are bound to be overshadowed by the exoticism of his other exploits. For the latest scandal is the allegation that Mr. Richmond periodically had his aides buy him cocaine and marijuana. It's hard to predict how his beleaguered supporters will respond to this one, but some of his Democratic colleagues don't want to wait and find out. Meade Esposito, the Brooklyn Democratic leader, has urged him to "resign immediately for the good of the party." Don't bet on his accommodating the boss. But Mr. Richmond probably shouldn't bet on his constituents accommodating him either, for if he runs again, he may be doing so in a redrawn district (Brooklyn Heights out, new Hispanic areas in) and he might not be able to count on the old rapport. Crime, counseling, and Congressional office may not be a winning combination much longer.

IT'S A DIRTY TRICK to name a public school after the man who said that "soap and education are not as sudden as a massacre, but they are more deadly in the long run." But the Mark Twain Intermediate School in Fairfax County, Virginia, is doing its best to make it up to the author: school officials are trying to remove *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (which they call racist) from the curriculum. I reckon this would suit Mark Twain just fine. Custodians of our culture are outraged at this philistine prohibition of a "quintessentially American masterpiece," as a *Washington Post* editorial hailed it, "one of the true classics of 19th-century literature." But Mark Twain would have seen the threat of a ban differently. He defined a classic as "something that everybody wants to have read and nobody wants to read"—especially seventh, eighth, and ninth graders who are told by their teachers that they should want to read it. Under such didactic duress, reading a classic is worse than edifying; it is outright *work*—in Twain's words, "whatever a body is obliged to do," which he rated most disagreeable of all. Bodies, especially those in intermediate schools, much prefer play, "which consists of whatever [they're] not obliged to do." And what they like best of all is whatever they're prohibited to do. "Adam was but human—this explains it all," Twain wrote. "He did not want the apple for the apple's sake, he wanted it because it was forbidden." It's high time that teachers heeded the warning Twain posted at the opening of *Huck Finn*, which ought to have deterred them from appropriating the book for their lesson plans long ago: "Persons attempting to find a motive in this narrative will be prosecuted; persons attempting to find a moral in it will be banished; persons attempting to find a plot in it will be shot. BY ORDER OF THE AUTHOR." Prohibited by school officials and threatened by the author himself, students—if Twain was right—should be dying to read his book.

A. H.

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